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Bizarre Love Triangle:
The Spending Clause, Section 1983,
and Medicaid Entitlements
Nicole Huberfeld∗
The first two terms of the Roberts Court signal a willingness to revisit
precedent, even decisions that have been considered long-settled, and the
United States Supreme Court may be ready to reinterpret another area of
jurisprudence: the private enforcement of conditions on federal spending
against states through actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The most recent
pre-Roberts Court precedent is Gonzaga University v. Doe, a 2002
decision that made it more difficult for individuals harmed by violations of
federal laws to enforce rights through § 1983 actions. Federal courts have
inconsistently and confusingly applied the Gonzaga framework, but the
Rehnquist Court would not revisit the rule.
Last term, however, the Roberts Court granted a petition for writ of
certiorari that would have required reconsidering Gonzaga. Before it
could be heard on the merits, the respondents mooted the case, but
petitions for certiorari regularly arise in similar Medicaid enforcement
cases. Thus, Gonzaga could be revisited in the context of enforcement of
Medicaid statutory entitlements.
Medicaid does not contain an
enforcement mechanism, but the Supreme Court has facilitated
enforcement of federal statutory rights against state officers through §
1983. However, this paper highlights recent events that increase the
fragility of Medicaid.
The first part of this paper explores the structure of Medicaid and key
provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 that could change Medicaid
from a program of promised care and benefits into one of no enforceable
∗
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promises. The second part of this paper discusses Supreme Court
decisions that reveal hostility to enforcement of conditions on spending
legislation by beneficiaries under § 1983. This part also explores how
changes in the Court’s composition may allow this view to become the
prevailing rule. Additionally, this section demonstrates the narrowing
ability of individuals to enforce Medicaid entitlements through § 1983 due
to two distinct but related splits in the circuit courts. The final part of this
paper analyzes the Court’s hostility to enforcing conditions on spending by
§ 1983 and proposes legislative responses to the possible demise of the
Medicaid entitlement.
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INTRODUCTION
The Roberts Court’s first two terms indicate a willingness to revisit
precedent, including decisions that have been considered long-settled.1
The United States Supreme Court can signal intent both by the
petitions for certiorari that it grants and those that it denies, but it
appears that the Court is poised to reinterpret another area of
jurisprudence2: the private enforcement of conditions on federal
spending against states through claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“§ 1983”).3 The most recent precedent on point is Gonzaga
University v. Doe, a 2002 decision that made it more difficult for
individuals harmed by violations of federal laws to enforce statutory
rights through § 1983 claims.4 Federal circuit and district courts have
inconsistently and confusingly applied the Gonzaga framework,5
which was supposed to clarify private causes of action under § 1983.
The Rehnquist Court, however, was not interested in revisiting the
Gonzaga rule.6
Last term, in contrast, the Roberts Court granted a petition for writ
of certiorari to Arkansas and its Medicaid officials that would have

1

See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2765 (2007) (relying on Brown v. Board of Education as precedent to prevent grade
school integration based in part on racial integration); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (2007) (providing novel interpretation of starting
point for Title VII workplace discrimination claim); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct.
1610, 1635-37 (2007) (upholding Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 despite lack
of exception to ban for health of mother, contrary to all prior expressions of liberty
interest at issue in abortion rights cases).
2
See infra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
3
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) [hereinafter “§ 1983”].
4
536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). Though little-noticed at the time the Court issued its
decision, the case has become a source of confusion in the lower federal courts and of
controversy among scholars. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Limiting Suits to Enforce Federal
Laws, 39 JAN. TRIAL 70, 70 (2003) (noting that Gonzaga would limit plaintiffs’ ability
to bring § 1983 actions and that Chief Justice Rehnquist was quoted at conference
calling Gonzaga important “sleeper decision”); see also TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST,
DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A
RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 96 (2003) (noting Gonzaga Court’s skepticism regarding
enforcing Spending Clause conditions by § 1983 causes of action).
5
See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
6
See Sasha Samberg-Champion, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a
Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2003) (noting
that Court rejected number of petitions for certiorari that would have facilitated
revisiting confusion created by Gonzaga).
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required the Court to revisit Gonzaga.7 Before it could be heard on the
merits, however, the respondents voluntarily mooted the case after a
conversation with the Solicitor General.8 Nevertheless, petitions for
certiorari regularly arise in similar Medicaid enforcement cases.9
Though the Court recently rejected a petition for certiorari from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and two petitions from the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals,10 denials that support decisions by the
circuits to “close the courthouse doors” to Medicaid enrollees,11 the
Court will likely take up the issue again in the near future.12
Thus, the context in which the Court could revisit Gonzaga is the
enforcement of Medicaid statutory entitlements via § 1983.13
Medicaid does not contain a federal enforcement mechanism for
individuals who do not receive the benefits promised by their states as
7

See Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3000, 3000 (2007)
(granting writ and disposing of case by summary action).
8
See generally Petitioners’ Response to Respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness at 2-3,
Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1356 (June 11, 2007) (No. 06-415)
(describing that parties met with Solicitor General’s office after filing their briefs, after
which respondents voluntarily dismissed their case); Posting of Lyle Denniston to
SCOTUSblog, Case on Children’s Health Benefits May End, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/
(June 12, 2007, 14:26 EST) (noting that clinics, treatment centers, children and parents
decided to dismiss case as moot).
9
See generally Kidd v. Doe, 501 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1483 (2008) (denying writ of certiorari because respondents waived right to file
response brief in case).
10
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v.
Fogarty, No. 06-1482 (10th Cir. May 7, 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 68 (2007).
11
Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 539 (2003) (describing trend in Rehnquist Court decisions of
narrowing civil rights litigants’ access to courts).
12
A petition for certiorari on the Supreme Court’s 2007-2008 Appellate Docket
was not addressed in the 2008 term, but the Court denied the petition early in the
2009 term. See Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, No. 07-1160 (5th Cir. Mar.
12, 2008), http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-1160.htm.
13
See Petitioners’ Response to Respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness at 2-3, Selig,
127 S. Ct. 1356 (No. 06-415) (vacating judgment in lower courts and directing
dismissal for mootness). Then-Judge Alito, concurring in the decision of Sabree v.
Richman, a Third Circuit case that allowed Medicaid enrollees to enforce individual
federal rights to Medicaid services under § 1983, provided insight into his position on
the use of § 1983 to enforce Medicaid entitlements: “While the analysis and decision
of the District Court may reflect the direction that future Supreme Court cases in this area
will take, currently binding precedent supports the decision of the Court. I therefore
concur in the Court’s decision.” 367 F.3d 180, 194 (2004) (emphasis added). Judge
Alito was agreeing, indirectly, with the district court judge who found that Medicaid
was a cooperative federal-state program that did not provide the kind of rights that are
enforceable through § 1983 actions. See Sabree v. Houston, 245 F. Supp. 2d 653, 66061 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

2008]

Bizarre Love Triangle

417

required by federal guidelines.14 For decades, this omission was not
overwhelmingly problematic, as the Supreme Court facilitated
enforcement of federal statutory rights against state officers through §
1983.15 Indeed, the sheer quantity of lower federal court cases might
lead the casual observer to believe that Medicaid providers and
enrollees have a firm foundation to enforce Medicaid entitlements
through § 1983 claims.16 This paper, however, contends that
Medicaid is metamorphosing into a right without a remedy due to
federal courts’ inconsistent interpretation of § 1983.17
Recent events reveal the fragility of the § 1983 enforcement
mechanism. First, various currently-sitting Justices have displayed
skepticism regarding private parties’ ability to enforce conditions on
spending through § 1983; this doubt appears to be supported by a
majority now that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are on the
Court.18 Second, a circuit divide exists regarding how to apply
Gonzaga to Medicaid entitlements. This split is exacerbated by a
newly popular theory adopted by a few circuits that the phrase
“medical assistance” in the Medicaid Act merely requires states to pay,
14
Though Medicaid does contain an administrative process for simple claims denial,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.151-.154, 431.200-.245 (2008),
and a notification process for denial of eligibility, see 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 (2008); see
also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement, 22 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 145, 145-46 (2003) (describing lack of access to federal courts for Medicaid
enrollees); Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a
Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 23-24 (2006) (noting that
unlike Medicare and ERISA, Medicaid contains no federal cause of action).
15
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 1 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Section 1983 creates the cause of action for violations of federal law under color of
state law; Ex parte Young allows state officers to be sued for injunctive relief under §
1983 by holding that state officers are not the state for purposes of sovereign
immunity, thereby avoiding 11th Amendment issues. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 156 (1908).
16
See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text; see also Jost, supra note 14, at
148 n.21. Professor Jost provided statistics regarding Medicaid enrollees’ and
providers’ § 1983 lawsuits for 1999 and 2000: in 1999,

recipients and providers prevailed in 53[%] of the reported federal court
cases that they brought against Medicaid programs, while in 2000 they won
48[%] of these cases. Recipients were more successful than providers,
prevailing 61[%] of the time in suits in 1999 and 2000, while providers
prevailed only 35[%] of the time in 1999 and 38[%] in 2000.
Id. at 148. In the accompanying footnote, Professor Jost notes both enrollees and
healthcare providers were less successful upon appeal, “where state Medicaid agencies
won 83[%] of the reported cases in 1999 and 81[%] in 2000.” Id. at 148 n.21.
17
See Samberg-Champion, supra note 6, at 1884.
18
See discussion infra Part III.
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not to provide care or services.19 Finally, the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005 turns long-standing premises of Medicaid upside down by
allowing states to provide the “actuarial equivalent” of benefits that
heretofore were mandated by federal law.20
This paper will explore the contours of these trends in turn. The
first part will review the structure of Medicaid and examine key
provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 that change Medicaid
from a program of promised care and benefits into one of no
enforceable promises. The second part of this paper will discuss the
trends in federal court decisions regarding enforcement of federal
spending statutes through § 1983 that reveal hostility to enforcement
by beneficiaries of federal spending. This part also will explore how
changes in the Court’s composition may allow this view, previously
expressed as dicta, to become the prevailing rule. Additionally, this
part will demonstrate the narrowing ability of individuals — both
patients and healthcare providers — to enforce Medicaid entitlements
through § 1983 due to two distinct but related splits in the circuit
courts. The final part of this paper will analyze the Court’s resistance
to enforcing § 1983’s conditions on spending, which diminishes both
individual rights and federal power. This part will conclude by
proposing legislative responses.
I.

MEDICAID — A FRAGILE RIGHT WITH A DIMINISHING REMEDY

Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as companion legislation to
Medicare.21 Congress structured Medicaid as a federal welfare
program, meaning it was a temporary source of help when people
became “medically indigent.” Medicaid augmented the welfare system
and eased states’ budgetary issues.22 As such, Medicaid’s funding
derives from general tax revenue rather than the payroll tax that helps
to fund Medicare, a structural aspect of Medicaid that causes ongoing
political vulnerability.23 Medicaid was never designed to provide
assistance to all Americans who could not afford medical care; instead,
the program allows only the “deserving poor” to enroll for its
19

See infra Part III.B.
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6044 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
21
See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 47-51 (1974) (describing Medicaid as “ill-designed”
compared to Medicare).
22
See id. at 53.
23
See id. (describing one of driving forces of Medicaid as desire to help remove
people from welfare roles, not to assist those who could not afford healthcare as
philosophical matter); see also JOST, supra note 4, at 15-17, 271.
20
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benefits.24 Although Medicaid currently covers about fifty-five million
Americans, eligibility limitations restrict the program to only about
forty percent of the poor and near-poor.25 Medicaid covers people
who are blind, disabled, elderly, and pregnant, as well as children (and
their families) who meet a certain poverty level set by statutorilydefined percentages of the federal poverty line.26 Courts have
traditionally treated Medicaid as a statutory entitlement for those who
rely on it.27 Medicaid is not perfect (or philosophically coherent),28
but it is indispensable as the most consistent device that ensures
access to healthcare for underprivileged populations.29
Medicaid is a classic example of cooperative federalism;30 in the
federal statutory scheme creating the Medicaid program (referred to as
the “Medicaid Act”31), the federal government promises federal money
to the states in exchange for states’ promise to fulfill certain conditions
on those funds by providing medical assistance to mandatory categories
of people.32 The state must submit a “State plan” to participate in
24
See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 57; see also Mary Ann Bobinski &
Phyllis Griffin Epps, Women, Poverty, Access to Health Care, and the Perils of Symbolic
Reform, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 233, 248 n.92 (2002) (noting that, contrary to
popular perception, Medicaid covers only certain categories of poor).
25
See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 3
(2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7334.cfm. See generally KAISER COMM’N ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE (2007),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-02.pdf (describing Medicaid program in
basic terms and noting limitations that make it so that Medicaid covers less than half
of population).
26
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A) (2006).
27
Arguing for an entitlement program that covers all Americans, Professor Jost
notes that “entitlements to health-care coverage may not guarantee health-care
services at all if those rights are not legally enforceable, even if the state provides these
services directly . . . .” JOST, supra note 4, at 270.
28
See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 53.
29
See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 6.
30
See, e.g., Wis. Dept. of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495
(2002) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980)) (stating that Medicaid Act
fosters cooperative federalism and describing program). Typically, when states are
required to spend state government funds to create programs that are co-founded and
funded by the federal government within the structure called cooperative federalism,
the funds are spent on a program that the state controls according to federal
guidelines. If the state does not like the federal government’s guidelines, it need not
accept federal money and thus either self-funds or does not institute the program. See
also Elizabeth A. Weeks, Cooperative Federalism and Healthcare Reform: The Medicare
Part D “Clawback” Example, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 79, 94 (2007).
31
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2006).
32
42 U.S.C. § 1396a. Medicaid is the largest grant of federal funds to the states,
by some estimates accounting for nearly 40% of all federal dollars received by states.
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Medicaid, which contains mandatory and optional elements.33 Thus,
the Medicaid Act contains language describing medical assistance — a
term that refers to Medicaid itself — as an entitlement for enrollees.
The entitlement for funds to create medical assistance extends to the
state, healthcare providers who treat Medicaid patients, and Medicaid
enrollees.34 Importantly, states must provide at least as much as the
federal government requires in the conditions on its funds, but states
cannot provide less than the federal Medicaid statutes and regulations
order.35 States also can fulfill the demands for State plans by obtaining
waiver approval from the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (“DHHS”) for a managed care version of Medicaid
rather than a fee-for-service format.36

See Bipartisan Comm. on the Medicaid Act of 2005, H.R. 985, 109th Cong. § 2(13)
(2005) (stating as part of its findings that: “Medicaid is the single largest Federal
grant-in-aid program to the States, accounting for over 40[%] of all Federal grants to
States.”).
33
42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
34
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(d) (describing amount of federal funds to which
state is “entitled”); 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(k) (describing federal assistance available for
calculating managed care benefits for individuals “entitled to” Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. §
1396e (describing guidelines for creating group health plans for individuals “entitled”
to Medicaid); see also JOST, supra note 4, at 32 and attendant endnotes (conveying list
of provisions within 42 U.S.C. § 1396 that contain word “entitle”).
35
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (“A State plan for medical assistance must . . . .”)
(emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (stating that “at the option of the
State” certain other categories of people can be covered); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (“The
Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection
(a) . . . .”). Additional services also can receive matching funds. See 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(a); see also ANDY SCHNEIDER, RISA ELIAS, RACHEL GARFIELD, DAVID ROUSSEAU &
VICTORIA WACHINO, THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID
AND THE UNINSURED 57 (2002), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2236-index.cfm.
36
42 U.S.C. § 1396n. The first version of the Medicaid waiver was § 1915(b)
waivers, passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396n (Social Security Act § 1915). The second type of waiver, a § 1115
waiver, allowed state experimentation to cover the uninsured without increasing costs
to the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2000) (Social Security Act §
1115(a)). The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 allowed states to simply amend their State
plans to implement managed care rather than requiring them to seek waivers. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396u-2. Some studies have shown that increased flexibility through waivers
for managed care and other programs decreases the level of care for Medicaid
enrollees. See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to
Medicaid: Empirical Evidence That Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States
Harms Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 974-75, 982 (2002) (providing evidence that
increased state control of Medicaid leads to worse access to and provision of
healthcare for poor).
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A key defining feature of Medicaid has been the equal coverage that
it provides enrollees.37 By federal law, if a person qualifies for
Medicaid in terms of poverty level and categorical eligibility, then that
person must not only receive relatively prompt Medicaid coverage but
also the same medical assistance as every other person in that category
of eligibility.38 Accordingly, each pregnant woman who qualifies for
Medicaid receives the same services; each blind person who qualifies
for Medicaid receives the same services; and each child who qualifies
for Medicaid receives the same services. The promised equal benefits
have been called, in short form, “comparability” (all enrollees within a
category of eligibility must have access to the same items and
services),39 “statewideness” (the State plan must be in effect in all
political subdivisions of the state),40 “freedom of choice” (enrollees
must be able to choose which healthcare provider treats them),41 and
“assurance of transportation” to medically necessary services.42 The
federal statutes and regulations that mandate baseline Medicaid
benefits require states to provide minimal medical assistance, a
promise of certain specified benefits that is unique.43 This is the
“defined benefit approach” of Medicaid.44 The equal access, equal
coverage aspect of Medicaid has been the basis for enrollees’
enforcement of Medicaid’s entitlements through § 1983, discussed in
greater detail below.45
States traditionally have had leeway in structuring State plans, but
they often seek more flexibility in Medicaid. The latest effort to give
37

42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), (a)(10).
39
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B).
40
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1).
41
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23).
42
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(70); 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (2008); see also CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005:
A MEDICAID
INFORMATION SOURCE 11 (2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenInfo/
Downloads/MedicaidAtAGlance2005.pdf.
43
See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 13.
44
See id. at 40-41. Professor Rosenbaum writes:
38

Under a defined benefit approach, the [Medicaid] entitlement consists of an
entitlement to coverage encompassing a broad array of specified benefits;
indeed, the detailed nature of benefit specification is such that much of the
Medicaid litigation that has taken place over the past four decades has
focused on the enforcement of federal coverage rights in terms of benefit
class and amount, duration, and scope.
Id. at 41.
45
See infra Part III.B.
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states more flexibility was encompassed in the Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005 (“the DRA”), which begins to morph Medicaid from a defined
benefit program into a defined contribution program.46 Section 6044
of the DRA, also called the “Benchmark Provision,” allows states to
modify their State plans so that they provide what is called
“benchmark coverage.”47 Benchmark coverage essentially permits
states to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in non-Medicaid managed care
plans, which by definition includes the Federal Employee Health
Benefit Program, state employee health benefit programs, or any plan
already offered by a major health maintenance organization in the
state.48 Benchmark coverage, according to the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) draft regulations, is intended to afford
“[s]tates unprecedented flexibility within Medicaid State Plans to
provide health benefits coverage.”49 This “unprecedented flexibility”
led CMS to draft the interpretive regulations so that comparability,
statewideness, freedom of choice, and the assurance of transportation
are not required of a state that has amended its State plan to include
benchmark coverage.50 Also, states can force a large portion of the
Medicaid population to enroll in benchmark coverage and can provide
different benefits within eligibility categories, though the DRA excepts
some of the particularly vulnerable and short-term categories of

46
See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 40-41. President Bush sought to transform
Medicaid into a block-grant program as part of the DRA but was not successful. See
Jeanne M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block Grant Program: An Analysis of the
Implications of Past Proposals, 83 MILBANK Q. 41, 46-47 (2005).
47
Section 6044, “State flexibility in benefit packages,” provides the following
regarding modification of State plans:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a State, at its option as a
State plan amendment, may provide for medical assistance under this title to
individuals within one or more groups of individuals specified by the State
through enrollment in coverage that provides — (i) benchmark coverage
described in subsection (b)(1) or benchmark equivalent coverage described
in subsection (b)(2); and (ii) for any child under 19 years of age who is
covered under the State plan under section 1902(a)(10)(A), wrap-around
benefits to the benchmark coverage or benchmark equivalent coverage
consisting of early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services
defined in section 1905(r).
42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(1)(A) (2006).
48
Id. § 1396u-7(b)(1).
49
73 Fed. Reg. 9714, 9715 (Feb. 22, 2008).
50
See id. at 9715, 9718, 9721, 9727.
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enrollees, such as those eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid
(“dual eligibles”).51
In addition, states now have the option to provide “benchmark
equivalent coverage,” which also relieves the states of traditional
mandatory services, comparability, statewideness, freedom of choice,
and the assurance of transportation requirements.52 Benchmark
equivalent coverage is defined minimally compared to the lists of
services and items traditionally required by the Medicaid Act. States
must cover inpatient and outpatient hospital care, physician services,
laboratory and x-ray services, well-baby care, and immunizations,53 and
those services must be supplied by the “actuarial equivalent” of the
listed benchmark coverage providers.54 Benchmark equivalent coverage

51

The statute provides:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a State may require that a fullbenefit eligible individual . . . within a group obtain benefits under this title
through enrollment in coverage . . . . A State may apply the previous
sentence to individuals within [one] or more groups of such individuals. . . .
A State may not require . . . an individual to obtain benefits through
enrollment . . . if the individual is within one of the following categories of
individuals: (i) Mandatory pregnant women . . . , (ii) Blind or disabled
individuals . . . , (iii) Dual eligibles . . . , (iv) Terminally ill hospice
patients . . . , (v) Eligible on basis of institutionalization . . . , (vi) Medically
frail and special medical needs individuals . . . , (vii) Beneficiaries qualifying
for long-term care services . . . , (viii) Children in foster care receiving child
welfare services and children receiving foster care or adoption
assistance . . . , (ix) TANF and section 1396u-1 parents . . . , (x) Women in
the breast or cervical cancer program . . . , [or] (xi) Limited services
beneficiaries. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(2) (emphasis added).
52
See id.; see also id. § 1396u-7(a)(1), (b)(2). The statute defines benchmark
equivalent coverage as:
The coverage includes benefits for items and services within each of the
following categories of basic services:
(i) Inpatient and outpatient hospital services.
(ii) Physicians’ surgical and medical services.
(iii) Laboratory and x-ray services.
(iv) Well-baby and well-child care, including age-appropriate immunizations.
(v) Other appropriate preventive services, as designated by the Secretary.
Id. § 1396u-7(b)(2).
53
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(2).
54
The statute provides that a benchmark equivalent
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essentially allows states to supply money for payment of premiums
rather than a well-defined healthcare program. Instead of carefully
planned, statutorily-designed care and services, states can pay a private
insurer who does not have to comply with the Medicaid Act.55
Thus, the federal government has given states “unprecedented
flexibility”56 that holds them to a monetary standard rather than a
benefit requirement, thereby rendering Medicaid a “premium support”
program that gives private insurers control over access to both benefits
and providers, without attendant accountability.57 In addition, for the
first time, states can treat Medicaid enrollees within a category of
eligibility differently.58 Although the states also sought to close off

has an aggregate actuarial value that is at least actuarially equivalent to one
of the benchmark benefit packages described in paragraph [b](1).
(C) Substantial actuarial value for additional services included in benchmark
package. With respect to each of the following categories of additional
services for which coverage is provided under the benchmark benefit
package used under subparagraph (B), the coverage has an actuarial value
that is equal to at least 75[%] of the actuarial value of the coverage of that
category of services in such package:
(i) Coverage of prescription drugs.
(ii) Mental health services.
(iii) Vision services.
(iv) Hearing services.
Id. § 1396u-7(b)(2)(B)-(C). A qualified actuary must make the determination of
actuarial equivalency, taking into account certain factors. See id. § 1396u-7(b)(3).
55
42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7.
56
See Sidney D. Watson, The View from the Bottom: Consumer Directed Medicaid
and Cost Shifting to Patients, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 403, 404 (2007).
57
Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 41. Professor Rosenbaum defines “premium
support” as a monetary contribution toward paying for health coverage, which would
reduce the Medicaid entitlement to a certain promised contribution rather than a
defined set of benefits. Id.
58
Id. at 33. For example, Kentucky’s DRA program has four different plans and is
one of the first states to implement the DRA Benchmark Provision. See KyHealth
Choices,
Member
Section,
https://kentucky.fhsc.com/kmaa/sectionMains/
MembersMain.asp (click “benefit packages”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2007). The four
plans are dubbed Global Choices, Family Choices, Optimum Choices, and
Comprehensive Choices. Id. Global Choices is the plan for most Medicaid enrollees
(which the state calls “members”), and it covers what the state calls basic medical
services, mental health services, and hearing and vision services for people under 18.
Id. Global Choices does not promise more than the Benchmark Coverage Equivalent
requires. Id. Family Choices is the Kentucky Medicaid plan for most children, and it
covers checkups and screenings, prescriptions, shots, doctor visits, eye exams and
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court access to Medicaid enrollees, they were not successful
incorporating this element into the DRA.59 At the time of this writing,
eleven states had taken advantage of DRA flexibility.60
The DRA Benchmark Provision, as discussed below, exacerbates a
trend in the circuit courts that defines Medicaid as mere payments to
the states rather than a system of medical care and services for
enrollees.61
This provision alone could thwart enrollees’ and
providers’ private enforcement actions against states,62 but the
prospect is underlined by a double circuit court split pertaining to
enforcement of conditions on federal spending by private parties
through § 1983. Combined, these developments make it so that some
provisions of the Medicaid Act are now enforceable by § 1983 and
some are not, depending on the statutory provision, the State plan,
and the circuit’s interpretation of § 1983 jurisprudence.

glasses, hearing services, dental care, hospital care, and mental health services. Id.
This closely follows EPSTD requirements. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(4) (2006), 1396r
(2006). Optimum Choices covers enrollees who have mental retardation or
developmental disabilities, and it articulates the goal of “keep[ing] a member out of an
institution and in the community.” KyHealth Choices, Member Section. Though
logistically separate, Optimum Choices has all the same benefits as Global Choices.
Id. The fourth part of Kentucky’s Medicaid DRA program is Comprehensive Choices,
which covers enrollees in nursing homes and those who are ventilator-dependent or
who have an acquired brain injury. Id. This part has the same benefits as Global
Choices. Id. CMS explains in the draft regulations that it has interpreted Congress’s
intent to give the states room to be creative as quite far-reaching. See generally 73
Fed. Reg. 9714, 9715 (Feb. 22, 2008) (asserting that Congress intended to provide
States with “unprecedented flexibility”).
However, subsequent administrative
interpretations have clarified that EPSDT benefits must still be provided, even in
benchmark plans. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a) (2006); see also JANE
PERKINS, THE DRA BENEFIT PROVISIONS AND EPSDT, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM 34 (2006), http://www.healthlaw.org/library/attachment.81954.
59
See NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY POSITION EC-16. MEDICAID REFORM § 16.2.5
(2005), http://www.nga.org (follow “Policy Positions” hyperlink; then follow “EC-16.
Medicaid Reform” hyperlink).
60
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT (DRA)
RELATED MEDICAID STATE PLAN AMENDMENTS (2008), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
DeficitReductionAct/03_SPA.asp#TopOfPage.
61
See Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003). As one of the
first states to amend its state plan to create a Benchmark Program, Kentucky will be
important to watch, as it also sits in the Sixth Circuit, which has adopted the limiting
definition of “medical assistance.” See Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532,
539-41 (6th Cir. 2006).
62
See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 33-34 (noting that this is long-standing goal
of National Governors’ Association).
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THE TRIANGLE — § 1983, SPENDING, AND BENEFICIARIES

That the federal government can place conditions on the receipt of
funds by the states is well established.63 Indeed, the Spending Clause
provides one of the broadest enumerated powers of Congress, though
the clause has generated relatively little guidance from the Supreme
Court.64 Generally the federal government enforces its own conditions
on federal funds against the states.65 However, beneficiaries of federal
funding, when not receiving the promised benefits, can enforce the
undelivered conditions against states by suing state officers through §
1983 claims pursuant to the holding in Maine v. Thiboutot.66
63
The idea that Congress can place conditions on spending to legislate behavior
that may not otherwise be regulable dates back to Oklahoma v. Civil Service
Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 137 (1947).
64
See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst:
A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1198-99 (2004) (noting that expansive Spending Clause power was
little touched by Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution). Though two decades old,
Professor Rosenthal’s observations still ring true:

The Supreme Court has seldom dealt directly with the validity of conditional
federal spending, and its opinions in this area have not been especially
helpful. Although what is decided with respect to such spending could
render irrelevant many generally accepted doctrines concerning the powers
of and limitations upon the federal government, remarkably little scholarly
attention has been paid to the problem as an aspect of constitutional law.
Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1103, 1106 (1987). Professor Rosenthal further noted that even when the Supreme
Court engaged in a Spending Clause analysis and reiterated that the spending power is
not unlimited, the Court never found limits on spending to actually exist. Id. at 1110.
But see generally Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for
Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461 (2002)
(positing that conditions are more pernicious than outlawed commandeering and thus
should not be placed on federal funds because they impose even greater burdens on
state autonomy and because they distort horizontal competition between states and
vertical competition between state and federal governments).
65
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981). Justice
Rehnquist wrote: “In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical
remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private
cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to
terminate funds to the state.” Id. The certitude of the statement is belied by the
reality that the federal agencies in charge of enforcing conditions on spending are
reluctant to enforce by withdrawing funds. See Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of
Federal Funding Conditions under Section 1983: The Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere
to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 UC DAVIS L. REV. 283, 292-93 (1996).
66
See 448 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980) (holding that § 1983 provides causes of action for
both constitutional and statutory violations and allowing award of attorney’s fees
against state under § 1988 in state court action). In Will v. Michigan Department of
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Three converging trends will likely have a profound impact on
§ 1983 litigation, especially as it relates to Medicaid. First, a majority
of Justices on the Roberts Court appear to believe that conditions on
spending are not enforceable by beneficiaries of federal spending
through § 1983 actions.67 Second, the circuits have been confused as
to the application of the most recent § 1983 case, Gonzaga, and the
Rehnquist majority’s dicta regarding private enforceability of
conditions on federal spending.68 Third, some circuits are interpreting
the foundational Medicaid statute and its “medical assistance”
language to impose lesser conditions on the states than have been
traditionally understood.69 Since the landmark decision in Thiboutot,
the Court has chipped away at the precedent that has allowed private
enforcement of federal laws in addition to constitutional rights.70 This
movement will be important for both Spending Clause jurisprudence
and for private enforcement of federal rights through § 1983.
A. Private Enforcement of Federal Spending Laws and the Roberts Court
The language of § 1983, a federal civil rights statute Congress
enacted in 1871, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .71
State Police, the Court held that a state is not a “person” that can be held liable for
damages under § 1983, narrowing the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot but not foreclosing
equitable actions against state officers through § 1983 for violations of federal law.
See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (noting that state
officers qualified as “persons” under § 1983).
67
See infra Part III.A.2.
68
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279-80 (2002).
69
See infra Part III.B.2.
70
See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 1. King v. Smith, in which the Court allowed private
causes of action for welfare recipients, foreshadowed Thiboutot. See King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 311-12 (1968). It was not until Thiboutot, however, that the Court held
specifically that § 1983 was available to enforce federal statutory rights in addition to
constitutional protections. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5-7.
71
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added). Congress passed § 1983 as part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was intended to protect freed slaves’ constitutional
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This verbiage has facilitated private lawsuits to enforce federal statutes
when their language does not provide a cause of action.72
1.

Spending Clause Legislation and § 1983 Enforcement Actions

Maine v. Thiboutot and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman created the foundation of modern § 1983 doctrine.73
Although Thiboutot was the first case to explicitly articulate the rule
allowing enforcement of federal statutory rights through § 1983
(rather than constitutional rights),74 Pennhurst is the favored decision
of the Court’s federalism-minded Justices, who appear interested in
returning to its holding and analysis.75 The Justices’ reliance on
Pennhurst is ominous, as Medicaid contains provisions that are quite
similar to the federal statute at issue in that case.76

rights in the “lawless and racist” South after the Civil War; later, the language of §
1983 deliberately included the phrase “and laws” pursuant to a statutory amendment
passed in 1874. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an
Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 483 n.6 (1982) (describing tension that
exists in § 1983 interpretation and noting that it derives in part from Congress’s lack
of guidance). See generally Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with
Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 86 (1989) (describing widely
varying approaches to interpretation of § 1983 and proposing more openly political
discourse surrounding its interpretation).
72
See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
73
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
74
Other cases related to the Social Security Act implied that § 1983 was available
for private causes of action, but none had set forth the rule expressed by Justice
Brennan in Thiboutot. See generally King, 392 U.S. at 311 (allowing private causes of
action for welfare recipients).
75
In fact, stricter standards for conditions on spending, recently enunciated in
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, were partially founded
on Pennhurst. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,
296 (2006) (setting forth “clear notice” test that states’ rights justices had long
desired). On May 21, 2007, the Court announced a decision that was noted for its
interpretation of the rights of parents to represent themselves and their children in
IDEA cases. See Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct.
1994, 2004-05 (2007). That decision also contained an affirmation of Arlington’s clear
notice standard. See id. at 2006. For a discussion of the line of dissents that became
the majority in Arlington, see Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on
Spending, Unclear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 441, 453-56 (2008). Arlington is likely to narrow Congress’s ability to place
conditions on federal funds, and the Court in Winkelman confirmed that
interpretation of Arlington. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2006. Arlington and Winkelman
can be seen as part of a larger trend in the Roberts Court — a willingness to revisit
Spending Clause doctrine. See Arlington, 548 U.S. at 297.
76
See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 5-6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6000 et seq. (1976)).
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The 1980 holding in Thiboutot permitted citizens to bring actions
against states for violations of all federal laws.77 Justice Brennan
determined that the historical modifications that resulted in the
language “and laws” in the recodification effort of 1874 were
deliberate and that the provision was expanded, intentionally, to
provide remedies for violations of the laws of the United States in
addition to violations of the United States Constitution.78 In other
words, Justice Brennan read the phrase “and laws” to provide a
statutory cause of action that was not limited to just those actions
traditionally considered civil rights actions.79 Justice Brennan’s
interpretation also avoided applying Cort v. Ash, which set forth a
limiting test for finding implied causes of action in federal statutes.80
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell’s dissent, which found that the
history of § 1983’s recodification dictated the opposite result from
Justice Brennan’s conclusion. Justice Powell was also deeply skeptical
about the “dramatic[]” expansion of litigation that could result from
the Court’s decision.81
Almost as soon as the Court read § 1983 to apply to all federal laws,
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist began to narrow that construal in the
holding and analysis of Pennhurst. Pennhurst marked the beginning of
a line of Supreme Court cases that declined to find a substantive right
enforceable through § 1983.82 Thus, Pennhurst often is cited as
support for the intertwined ideas that the federal government alone
enforces conditions on spending through withdrawal of funds and that
the ability to use § 1983 to privately enforce conditions on spending is
limited, if not non-existent.83 Justice Rehnquist noted that the “typical
remedy” for state noncompliance with conditions on spending
77

See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 7. The plaintiffs sued Maine for violations of the Social Security Act,
specifically the welfare provisions that would have permitted the family to receive
credit for child-support payments. See id. at 2-3. At the time, welfare was a
cooperative federal-state program, much like Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1991)
(amended 1996).
79
See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
80
See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
81
See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
82
See generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)
(holding that statutory bill of rights could not confer privately enforceable rights for
purposes of § 1983 claims). As the Court noted in Gonzaga: “Since Pennhurst, only
twice have we found spending legislation to give rise to enforceable rights. In Wright
v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority …[and] in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Association.” Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002).
83
See id. at 28. Pennhurst is also the progenitor of the requirement for “clear
notice” for placing conditions on spending. See Huberfeld, supra note 75, at 455.
78
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potentially conflicted with the holding in Thiboutot allowing private
causes of action against the offending state.84 However, because the
Court found that the Bill of Rights section of the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act was merely precatory and
conferred no substantive rights on the plaintiffs, the Court did not
analyze further whether beneficiaries of federal spending can use §
1983 to privately enforce conditions on spending.85 In other words,
the majority avoided interpretation of Thiboutot because it construed
the Bill of Rights as hortatory rather than mandatory.86 The Court in
Pennhurst also endorsed what has become a favorite theme for judges
who would limit the power to spend in general: the contract
analogy.87 As will be discussed below, federal courts cite the Pennhurst
contract analogy to support limitations on § 1983 causes of action and
to limit remedies for beneficiaries of federal spending in general. In
addition, an increasing number of federal judges cite Pennhurst to
support their decisions that Medicaid provisions are not privately
enforceable.88
Nine years after Pennhurst, the Court detoured briefly (yet
importantly) from the course of narrowing Thiboutot by allowing
healthcare providers who participated in Medicaid to challenge
Virginia’s reimbursement rates in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n.89 The
majority allowed an association of hospitals to enforce the Boren
Amendment requirement for reasonable and adequate payment rates
through a § 1983 action because the provision specifically required
states to pay reasonable rates.90 The Court read the Boren Amendment
84

See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28. Lower federal courts, in limiting or explaining
the extent to which § 1983 actions are available to enforce federal statutes, often cite
this dicta. See Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2007); Sabree ex rel.
Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2004).
85
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28 n.21.
86
Justice White’s dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, would have
found that the Bill of Rights was mandatory and thus enforceable through § 1983. See
id. at 39-53 (White, J., dissenting).
87
See id. at 17.
88
See Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 366 (4th Cir. 2007); Ball, 492 F.3d at 1104;
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005).
89
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). Wilder was influenced by two
intervening § 1983 decisions. Id. at 512. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority allowed tenants to enforce rent-ceilings created in the Brooke
Amendment to the Fair Housing Act by § 1983. See 479 U.S. 418, 439 (1987). The
second was the § 1983-limiting holding in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
90
See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509-20; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1980)
(consisting of now-repealed element of Medicaid Act that permitted healthcare
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to be mandatory, not precatory, which conferred a substantive and
specific federal right on Medicaid-participating healthcare providers that
was enforceable under § 1983.91 Justice Brennan echoed Justice
Rehnquist’s analysis in Pennhurst but found that, consistent with Justice
Rehnquist’s call for more than congressional expressions of preference,
Congress had created a definite right for healthcare providers by
requiring states to adopt reasonable and adequate rates for hospitals.92
Justice Brennan opened the door to enforcement claims by both
providers and Medicaid enrollees, arguably ensuring that the Medicaid
program was not excluded from § 1983 enforcement actions.93
The Wilder dissent, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined
by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, described Thiboutot as
eliminating implied cause of action standards, disapproving of the
decision while buttressing Justice Rehnquist’s narrow statutory
interpretation in Pennhurst (which had precluded a § 1983 cause of
action).94 The dissent read Pennhurst to prevent a § 1983 cause of
action because Congress did not intend the Boren Amendment to create
an enforceable right.95 The dissent’s analysis parallels the amicus brief
on behalf of the United States as written by then-Deputy Solicitor
General John G. Roberts. That amicus brief not only read the Boren
Amendment narrowly in concluding that it conferred no enforceable
rights but also opined that individual interests that arise as a result of
federal spending may not be enforceable as rights under § 1983.96
In 1997, the Court appeared to settle the scope of plaintiffs’ ability
to privately enforce federal laws using § 1983.97 Justice O’Connor’s
majority opinion in Blessing v. Freestone articulated a three-part test to
determine when § 1983 actions are permitted to enforce federal laws98:
First, the opinion instructed that Congress must intend that the
provision benefit the plaintiff. “Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the right . . . protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and
amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.
providers to contest payment rates states set for their Medicaid reimbursement).
91
See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512.
92
See id.
93
The petitioners argued that the Medicaid Act precluded private causes of action,
even though no private cause of action exists in the Medicaid statutory or regulatory
provisions and Congress had not directly addressed the issue. See id. at 520-21.
94
See id. at 525-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
95
See id. at 525.
96
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11,
Wilder, 496 U.S. 498 (No. 88-2043) (relying on Pennhurst).
97
See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
98
See id.
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Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on
the States,” meaning it “must be couched in mandatory . . . terms.”99
Justice O’Connor’s analysis relied in part on Wilder and Pennhurst;
ultimately the aggregate nature of the welfare provision at issue
defeated the plaintiffs’ claims because no individual right existed in
the statutory language.100 The Court, however, preserved plaintiffs’
ability to bring § 1983 claims to enforce federal statutes, including
other aspects of the welfare statute, which were connected to Medicaid
through statutory structure and benefits.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, agreed with the Blessing
majority that no private cause of action existed given the generalized
relief sought, but his concurrence openly questioned the use of § 1983
to authorize beneficiaries of federal-state Spending Clause legislation to
bring suit.101 Justice Scalia relied on the Pennhurst contract analogy102
and compared enrollees in welfare programs to third-party beneficiaries
of contracts.103 According to the concurrence, the relationship between
99
Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court denied mothers the right to enforce
child support provisions within the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
statutory scheme against Arizona because the newly articulated three-part test, which
drew upon Wilder, was not met. See id. at 345-46.
100
See id. at 341-48.
101
See id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia wrote:

I agree with the Court that under the test set forth in Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing Authority and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 42
U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit individual beneficiaries of Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act to bring suit challenging a State’s failure to achieve
“substantial compliance” with the requirements of Title IV-D. That
conclusion makes it unnecessary to reach the question whether § 1983 ever
authorizes the beneficiaries of a federal-state funding and spending agreement —
such as Title IV-D — to bring suit.
See id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
102
The Pennhurst Court stated:
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature
of a contract; in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress’[s] power to
legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract” . . . .
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
103
See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia wrote:
Until relatively recent times, the third-party beneficiary was generally
regarded as a stranger to the contract, and could not sue upon it; . . . the
only person who could enforce the promise in court was the other party to
the contract . . . . This appears to have been the law at the time § 1983 was
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the federal government and the state did not provide an opportunity to
privately enforce breaches of the conditions the federal government
placed on the state because, at the time Congress passed § 1983 in 1871,
third-party beneficiaries to contracts had no ability to enforce or
challenge the contract that benefited them.104 Thus, Justices Scalia and
Kennedy would have narrowed significantly private parties’ ability to
bring § 1983 actions, stating that “the ability of persons in respondents’
situation to compel a State to make good on its promise to the Federal
Government was not a ‘righ[t] . . . secured by the . . . laws’ under §
1983.”105 Acknowledging that the Court had thus far permitted
beneficiaries’ private causes of action, Justice Scalia welcomed future
cases that challenged, in essence, any beneficiary suing to enforce
conditions on federal spending.106
Given the Scalia-Kennedy concurrence in Blessing, and the Court’s
ongoing narrowing of the § 1983 cause of action, the 2002 decision in
Gonzaga University v. Doe could have been more drastic.107 Chief
enacted. . . .
. . . I am not prepared without further consideration to reject the possibility
that third-party-beneficiary suits simply do not lie.
Id. at 349-50 (citation omitted). Justices Scalia and Kennedy appear to have found
persuasive the amicus brief of the Council of State Governments, National Governors’
Association, and other related parties, as the concurrence echoes many of the brief’s
points regarding whether federal spending statutes should be enforceable against
states by private parties. See Brief for the Council of State Governments, National
Governors’ Ass’n, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Ass’n of
Counties, International City/County Management Ass’n, and International Municipal
Lawyers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8-15, Blessing, 520 U.S. 329
(No. 95-1441), 1996 WL 422135. The amicus brief drew on the dissents in Wilder
and the Pennhurst majority as support for the proposition that no private cause of
action should exist. Id. at 13-14.
104
See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349-50 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia’s point
may not be as unassailable as asserted in the concurrence. For example, as early as
1859, New York courts applied trust principles to facilitate a suit by a third-party
beneficiary against the party breaching a contract. See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268,
274-75 (1859); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 653-57 (4th ed. 2004)
(describing historical development of third-party beneficiary doctrine). The briefs in
Gonzaga also bring this point to the fore, as John G. Roberts, then in private practice,
represented the university and articulated the same arguments that Justices Scalia and
Kennedy advanced in Blessing. See Brief for Petitioners at 39-43, Gonzaga Univ. v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (No. 01-679); see also Brief for Respondent at 46-49,
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273 (No. 01-679) (analyzing third-party beneficiary analogy and
describing why it is invalid method of interpreting § 1983 causes of action).
105
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106
See id.
107
See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 273. The Court held that a student could not sue
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Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion that narrowed, and
attempted to clarify, the Blessing test but did not absolutely reject
private enforcement of conditions on spending. However, the
majority expressed deep skepticism regarding private parties enforcing
federal conditions on spending against states. Citing Pennhurst, the
Court wrote: “unless Congress ‘speak[s] with a clear voice’ and
manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent to confer individual rights, federal
funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by §
1983.”108 The majority reiterated the observation from Blessing that
only twice since Thiboutot had the Court found that Spending Clause
legislation could give rise to privately enforceable rights.109
Emphasizing that more recent cases had rejected private causes of
action, the majority announced that § 1983 only provides a remedy for
deprivations of rights as conferred by a federal statute, not mere
benefits or interests — effectively limiting the nexus between § 1983
and Spending Clause legislation.110 Ultimately, the Court constructed
a new test that appears to replace part one of the Blessing test (though
the Court was not clear on the use or breadth of its clarifying
language). The test asks whether the statute in question confers
individual rights with the kind of language that is found in, by
example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 — “no person . . .
shall . . . be subjected to . . . .”111 In other words, Congress must
create new rights that are to be enforced by § 1983 in “clear and
unambiguous terms.”112
The concurrence and the dissent in Gonzaga expressed varying
degrees of skepticism regarding the Court’s narrowed view of the §
1983 cause of action. Justice Breyer’s concurrence disagreed with the
slender window of opportunity delineated by the majority and noted
that the majority would only find a right that allows a private party to

using § 1983 for a privacy breach under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (“FERPA”), a federal spending statute that ties funds for education to privacy of
student records. See id. at 276.
108
Id. at 280 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 28
n.21 (1981)).
109
See id. (citing Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990); Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987)).
110
See id. at 283 (citing Blessing as example of narrowing of § 1983 causes of
action since Thiboutot).
111
Id. at 284. The Title VI example is strange given that the Court rejected private
enforcement of § 602 of that provision by implied cause of action in Alexander v. Sandoval
just a year before Gonzaga. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287-89 (2001).
112
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290.
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sue “if set forth ‘unambiguously’ in the statute’s ‘text and structure.’”113
Justice Stevens’s dissent noted that that majority conflated causes of
action under § 1983 and implied causes of action generally (as
delineated by Cort v. Ash), thus imposing a more stringent test on
plaintiffs seeking to vindicate rights under § 1983 and a greater
burden on Congress to include rights-creating language in federal
laws.114 Justice Stevens also noted that it is virtually impossible to
reconcile Gonzaga with Wilder and Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Authority, accusing the majority of silently
overruling the two precedents.115
Three days before the decision in Gonzaga, the Court issued an
opinion in another Spending Clause case, Barnes v. Gorman.116
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reiterated the analysis
articulated in his Blessing concurrence and, relying on Pennhurst’s
contract analogy, determined that because punitive damages are not
available for breach of contract, they are not available for violations of
federal conditions on spending.117 More specifically, the Court held
that the contract analogy does not allow for punitive damages because
the funding recipient must be “on notice that, by accepting federal
funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature.”118 The majority
concluded that states would not accept federal funding if they knew at
the time they accepted the funding that punitive damages would be
available for violations of the conditions on spending.119 The majority
also emphasized that the federal government and/or the funding
113
Id. at 291 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justices Breyer and Souter agreed with the
majority, however, that the precise language of FERPA does not confer an individual cause
of action. See id. at 291-92.
114
See id. at 300-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115
Id. at 300 n.8; see supra note 89.
116
See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2002). The plaintiff in this case
(respondent) was a paraplegic who was injured when he was transported in a police
van that was not equipped to transport people with such disabilities. Id. at 183-84.
He successfully sued the local police under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the jury awarded compensatory and
punitive damages. See id. The issue confronting the Court was whether punitive
damages could be awarded to a private plaintiff under the ADA or section 504, both of
which contain Spending Clause elements. See id. at 185-86.
117
See id. at 187.
118
Id. The majority relied on the dissenting language in a series of Title IX cases
beginning with Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999). Justice Kennedy’s dissent became the majority
view in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,
304 (2006).
119
See Barnes, 536 U.S. at 188.
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recipient are made whole when the state’s contractual obligation is
fulfilled.120 Thus, the 2001-2002 term produced two cases that
continued the movement toward limited remedies for private parties
injured by states’ failure to meet conditions placed on federal funds.
These two cases were part of the Rehnquist Court’s quest for clear
statement rules in federal legislation.121
Gonzaga allowed Thiboutot to remain good, albeit hobbled,
precedent. On the other hand, Arlington Central School District Board
of Education v. Murphy, a first-term Roberts Court case, furthered the
Rehnquist Court’s goal of reining in individuals’ ability to enforce
conditions on spending against the states. In Arlington, Justice Alito
articulated a narrowed standard for conditions on spending by
requiring Congress to give the states “clear notice” of all conditions on
spending before they accept federal funds.122 Arlington seems to
render the Gonzaga modification of the Blessing test even narrower,
refusing any inference that § 1983 would allow private causes of
action without explicit statutory language.123
120

See id. at 188-89.
See Thomas M. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism after Raich: The Case for Clear
Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 825 (2005). Professor Merrill set forth
examples of the Rehnquist Court’s search for clear statement rules:
121

Thus, in cases involving the States’ immunity from lawsuits under the [11th]
Amendment, the Court held that such suits were permitted only if
authorized by Congress in “clear and unmistakable” language in the statute.
The Court similarly held that conditions attached to grants of federal monies
could be enforced against the States only if set forth “unambiguously” in the
grant. And in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court said it would interpret a federal
regulatory statute to apply to traditional state functions, such as the
appointment of state judges, only if there was a “plain statement” from
Congress requiring this result.
Id. (citations omitted).
122
See Arlington, 548 U.S. at 296; see also Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zeitlow,
The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347,
1364-66 (2005) (enumerating ways in which Rehnquist federalism revolution
narrowed avenues of enforcing individual rights and noting then-unexecuted interest
of conservative justices in containing individuals’ ability to enforce conditions on
spending and Spending Clause power in general).
123
A 2003 preemption case, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v.
Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003), also provided a platform for Justices Scalia and Thomas
to articulate skepticism regarding private causes of action to enforce conditions on
spending. See id. at 675 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 682-83 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas noted his doubt that beneficiaries of cooperative
federalism programs can sue to enforce their benefits, stating: “[W]ere the issue to be
raised, I would give careful consideration to whether Spending Clause legislation can
be enforced by third parties in the absence of a private right of action.” Id. at 683.
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Despite Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy’s leeriness to allow
private enforcement of conditions on spending by § 1983 claims,124
legislation created under the Spending Clause is still the law of the
land. The contract analogy cannot be more than that — an analogy,
perhaps a model for analysis, but not the law. Otherwise, conditions
placed on state acceptance of federal funds pursuant to the Spending
Clause would have less influence than other federal laws, and states
could take federal money with less fear of enforcement or penalty.125
Surely the Court does not intend to indicate that spending legislation
is not underpinned by the Supremacy Clause.126 Furthermore, thirdparty beneficiaries in the modern era can enforce contractual
provisions intended to benefit them.127 States participate in Medicaid
to benefit their poorest, neediest citizens, and they cannot be surprised
that enrollees are the intended beneficiaries of the partnership
between the federal and state governments.

124
For a more extreme position on this issue, see David E. Engdahl, The Spending
Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 49-53 (1994), which argues that the “Taxing Clause” does not
authorize federal spending and that instead the Article IV property clause authorizes
limited spending powers for Congress. Professor Engdahl also asserted that the
decision in Thiboutot “simply is nonsense” because beneficiaries of federal spending
directed at states should never have had the right to sue to collect on the conditioned
spending, and he predicted that the possibility of the opinion’s “survival in the face of
candid reassessment is very poor.” Id. at 108. Fundamental elements of the Thiboutot
doctrine have survived, but it certainly is a weakened precedent after nearly three
decades of chipping away.
125
See Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal
Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L.
REV. 600, 619-20 (1972) (explaining that federal agencies tend not to enforce
spending programs they oversee against states — instead, they attempt to coax
cooperation — and why beneficiary involvement would be helpful); see also Jane
Perkins, Medicaid: Past Successes and Future Challenges, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 7, 32-33
(2002) (noting that DHHS can withdraw all funding from state if it fails to comply
with its approved State Plan, but that this remedy has not been applied because it is
too draconian).
126
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Medicaid enrollees have had some minor success
with a Supremacy Clause argument that a state can “violate” the Supremacy Clause by
providing benefits that are so minimal as to “conflict” with the federal scheme, even
though Medicaid is a cooperative federalism program and not usually subject to
preemption analysis. See generally Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir.
2006) (allowing claim that Missouri failed to comply with certain Medicaid Act
requirements and thus had violated Supremacy Clause to survive summary judgment).
127
See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 104, § 10.3 (describing modern rule
for contract beneficiaries); see also Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 272-75 (1859).
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Trends

The thread of Spending Clause enforcement via § 1983 Supreme
Court cases reveals at least three ongoing and important developments.
First, the contract analogy for Spending Clause legislation that imposes
conditions on states’ use of federal funds remains in vogue. The Court
first articulated the idea of conditions on spending as an agreement
between the state and the federal government in Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, but the more severe contract analogy was made popular by
Associate Justice Rehnquist in Pennhurst.128 Pennhurst is the key citation
for federal judges who believe that conditions on federal spending
should be curbed to protect states.129 One of the more notable
examples, Sabree v. Houston, relied on Pennhurst for the proposition that
spending legislation rarely confers individual causes of action through §
1983.130 The district court’s rejection of all causes of action related to
enforcing Medicaid provisions131 was reversed by the Third Circuit
128
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981); see
also Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937) (describing
and approving of conditions on federal spending as being in nature of agreement
between state and federal government to undertake common goal). The majority in
Steward Machine was careful to describe conditions on federal spending as statutory
requirements that created an agreement with the states, and it did not wholly endorse
or reject the idea of the contract analogy; in other words, Justice Rehnquist stretched
the language of Steward Machine’s majority in Pennhurst. See Steward, 301 U.S. at 59798. Justice Cardozo wrote:

The inference of abdication thus dissolves in thinnest air when the deposit is
conceived of as dependent upon a statutory consent, and not upon a
contract effective to create a duty. By this we do not intimate that the
conclusion would be different if a contract were discovered . . . . The states
are at liberty, upon obtaining the consent of Congress, to make agreements
with one another. We find no room for doubt that they may do the like with
Congress if the essence of their statehood is maintained without impairment
. . . . Nowhere in our scheme of government — in the limitations express or
implied of our federal constitution — do we find that she is prohibited from
assenting to conditions that will assure a fair and just requital for benefits
received.
Id. at 597-98 (citations omitted). Steward is also an important case for rejecting the
Tenth Amendment argument against allowing conditions on federal spending, an idea
that seems to lurk behind the most recent Spending Clause decisions. Id. at 595-96.
129
See, e.g., Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 366 (4th Cir. 2007); Ball v. Rodgers, 492
F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2007); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.
2005).
130
See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Houston, 245 F. Supp. 2d 653, 657-58 (E.D. Pa.,
2003), rev’d, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004).
131
See id. Judge Hutton wrote: “[S]ection 1396 of Title XIX does not have the
rights-creating language integral to a showing of [c]ongressional intent to confer
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Court of Appeals, but then-Judge Alito revealed in a concurrence that
he believed the district court articulated the direction of “future
Supreme Court cases.”132 The future described by the district court
expressed skepticism that spending legislation can “confer individual
rights.”133 At first blush, Judge Alito’s concurrence would indicate a
change of heart from Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun in
which he had written that the new version of the Boren Amendment
was not enforceable by pharmacists against the Secretary of the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare but then hinted that
Medicaid enrollees might be able to assert § 1983 claims.134 However,
Judge Alito’s majority opinion in Houstoun is not so different from his
Sabree concurrence, because in choosing to diverge from the trend in
other circuits, the Houstoun opinion radically narrowed the ability of
Medicaid healthcare providers to enforce standards regarding
reimbursement for their services.135
Dissenting justices have expressed apprehension over the contract
analogy numerous times. Justice Souter’s and Justice Stevens’s
concurrences in Barnes v. Gorman underscored the increasing rigidity
with which the Court has applied the analogy.136 Justice Souter,
joined by Justice O’Connor, pointed out that the contract analogy
would not be a proper model in all cases of private claims under
Spending Clause legislation.137 Justice Stevens highlighted the Court’s
interest in expanding the contract-analogy reasoning from Pennhurst,
which has been a clear trend.138 The analogy taken literally also closes
the courthouse doors, which was attempted in the Medicaid context in

rights.” Id. at 659.
132
Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 194 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
133
See Sabree, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 657.
134
See Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 541-42 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that healthcare providers could not enforce Medicaid’s sufficient payment
provision). This Medicaid provision is the somewhat weaker follow-up to the
repealed Boren Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1994) (repealed 1997)
(concerning adequate payment for providers).
135
Justice Alito appears to have drawn on the Wilder dissent’s insistence on narrow
statutory interpretation in § 1983 causes of action. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496
U.S. 498, 526 (1990).
136
See 536 U.S. 181, 190-91 (2002) (Souter, J., concurring).
137
See id. (“I . . . read the Court’s opinion as acknowledging, that the contract-law
analogy may fail to give such helpfully clear answers to other questions that may be
raised by actions for private recovery under Spending Clause legislation . . . .”).
138
See id. at 193 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (pointing out dangers of contract
analogy and denouncing district court’s decision in Westside Mothers v. Haveman).
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the infamous district court decision in Westside Mothers v. Haveman.139
A second notable trend is that changes in the composition of the
Court during the Roberts era have enhanced support for the contract
analogy and the corollary argument against private enforcement
claims. Justice Alito, while serving on the Third Circuit, narrowed
Medicaid healthcare providers’ ability to enforce reimbursement
provisions through § 1983 and endorsed a district court decision that
would have denied entirely private causes of action to enforce
Medicaid statutory provisions.140 Also, though representing clients in
private practice is not a perfect predictor, when Chief Justice Roberts
represented Gonzaga University before the Supreme Court, he
advanced the idea that § 1983 cannot apply to Spending Clause
legislation due to the third-party beneficiary theory.141 John Roberts
had also taken this position as Deputy Solicitor General submitting an
amicus brief in Wilder.142 Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts thus
appear to agree with the Scalia and Kennedy Blessing concurrence,
which invited cases that would allow a direct attack on private
enforcement of spending legislation.143 Justice Thomas has likewise
rejected private causes of action to enforce spending clause
legislation.144 Justice O’Connor’s departure is also important for this

139
See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 575-82 (2001); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 538-39 (describing trend toward limiting civil rights
actions in Rehnquist Court years); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ensuring the Supremacy of
Federal Law: Why the District Court Was Wrong in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 12
HEALTH MATRIX 139, 147 (2002) (decrying district court’s decision for taking contract
analogy too literally, to nonsensical result) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Ensuring].
140
See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 194 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito,
J., concurring).
141
See Brief of Petitioners at 39-43, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)
(No. 01-679).
142
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11,
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
143
See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 350 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia wrote:

It must be acknowledged that Wright and Wilder permitted beneficiaries of
federal-state contracts to sue under § 1983, but the [contract] argument set
forth above was not raised. I am not prepared without further consideration to
reject the possibility that third-party-beneficiary suits simply do not lie. I join
the Court’s opinion because, in ruling against respondents under the
Wright/Wilder test, it leaves that possibility open.
Id. (emphasis added).
144
See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003)
(Thomas, J. concurring); see also supra note 123.
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calculus, as she did not vote consistently with the other states’-rights
Justices against private parties.145
The third trend is that it appears an “intentionalist” reading
currently dominates § 1983 jurisprudence, though the jurists who
apply the narrow reading of § 1983’s reach tend to claim a “textualist”
approach.146 In other words, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
have championed the theory that the Congress that drafted § 1983 in
1871 would not have intended § 1983 to extend to the citizens
benefited by federal spending programs or cooperative federalism
programs (such as Medicaid). This idea is at least questionable, given
that § 1983’s plain words specifically protect something more than
constitutional rights; the statute provides a claim for relief for
violations of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws . . . .”147 The language “and laws” includes
statutory rights in § 1983’s protections; and, if the language of the
statute is clear, legislative history need not be consulted.148 Justice
145

See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (voting with
individual-rights four to allow retaliation claim to move forward under Title IX). In
Jackson, a male physical education teacher and coach complained of sex
discrimination in the school’s athletics program and was fired from his coaching job
for repeated complaints of unequal funding and access for his girls’ basketball team.
Id. at 171-72. Justice O’Connor’s majority read Title IX broadly to allow the
retaliation claim, even though the coach had not experienced sex discrimination
directly. Id. at 174. As Professor Baker has noted, Justice O’Connor read the statute
as a civil rights-type statute and was inclined to interpret it broadly. See Lynn A.
Baker, Lochner’s Legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce County v. Guillen as a Case
Study, 85 B.U. L. REV. 727, 760-61 (2005).
146
See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending the Routine: Methodology and Constitutional
Values in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Statutory Cases, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 266-68
(Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006). Professor Frickey briefly describes three approaches to
legislative interpretation: textualist, which denotes an inclination to read only the
words of the statute; intentionalist, which signifies an interest in legislative history
and congressional intent; and purposivist, which allows a judge to read statutes
flexibly, as living documents, to fulfill “reasonable policy outcomes.” Id.; see also
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219-45 (2d ed. 2006) (describing and critiquing three
theories and their postulates).
147
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added).
148
See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S.
1, 6 (2000). Authoring the majority, Justice Scalia wrote:
[W]e begin with the understanding that Congress “says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.” . . . [W]hen “the statute’s
language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts’” — at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd — “‘is to enforce it according
to its terms.’”
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Scalia has asserted that “legislative intent is an oxymoron,”149 yet his
approach to § 1983 is not textualist, and limits plaintiffs’ access to the
court system.150
B. Beyond Gonzaga — The Double Circuit Split
Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s goal of clarifying § 1983 causes of
action to enforce federal statutes,151 Gonzaga’s legacy is a hodgepodge
of lower court decisions. Some courts have substituted Gonzaga for
the first element of the Blessing test,152 some courts primarily have
substituted Gonzaga for, or conflate, Gonzaga and Blessing,153 and
Id. (internal citations omitted). Before Justice Scalia joined the Court, Justice
Rehnquist had begun to seek a “constrained approach” to statutory interpretation, a
legacy of the Rehnquist Court. See Frickey, supra note 146, at 267-68. Professor
Frickey describes Justice Scalia’s approach as “text based.” See id. at 268-69. For a
brief list of the major scholarship on Justice Scalia’s textualist approach to legislation,
see ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 146, at 230 n.33.
149
Frickey, supra note 146, at 271 (adding that Justice Thomas tends to agree with
Justice Scalia’s “absolute exclusionary rule” regarding legislative findings).
150
See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
151
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Blessing might have created “confusion” and
“uncertainty.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282-83 (2002). The majority
acknowledged that its opinions in the § 1983 arena had created confusion in the lower
courts and were not “models of clarity,” which inspired the Court to grant certiorari
to “resolve any ambiguity.” Id. at 278.
152
See, e.g., Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 2007); Mandy R. v.
Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1146-48 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Mandy R. v.
Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542 (6th
Cir. 2006); Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 508-09 (8th Cir. 2006); Harris v.
Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2006); Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152,
1160 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Goldberg v. Watson, 127 S. Ct. 598 (2006);
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v.
Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 602-04 (5th Cir. 2004); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367
F.3d 180, 184 (3rd Cir. 2004); Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 428 F. Supp. 2d
585, 610-13 (W.D. Tex. 2006), rev’d, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007); Nelson v.
Milwaukee County, No. 04 C 0193, 2006 WL 290510 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 7, 2006); Nat’l
Med. Care, Inc. v. Rullan, No. Civ. 04-1812(HL), 2005 WL 2878094 (D.P.R. Nov. 1,
2005), motion to certify appeal granted by No. Civ. 04-1812(HL), 2006 WL 130766
(D.P.R. Jan. 13, 2006); Mundell v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Saguache County, No.
Civ.A05CV00585REBMJW, 2005 WL 2124842 (D. Colo. Sept. 2, 2005); Reynolds v.
Giuliani, No. 98 Civ.8877(WHP), 2005 WL 342106 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005);
Michelle P. ex rel. Deisenroth v. Holsinger, 356 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Ky. 2005);
Health Care for All, Inc. v. Romney, No. Civ.A.00-10833-RWZ, 2004 WL 3088654 (D.
Mass. Oct. 1, 2004); Memisovski ex rel. Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92 C 1982, 2004
WL 1878332 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004); Masterman v. Goodno, No. Civ.032939(JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 51271 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2004); Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v.
Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
153
See, e.g., Hawkins, 509 F.3d at 704; Bertrand ex rel. Bertrand v. Maram, 495 F.3d
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some courts effectively ignore Gonzaga.154 In the context of Medicaid
enforcement claims, the Gonzaga circuit split is further complicated by
452, 456-57 (7th Cir. 2007); Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d
56, 73 n.10 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Gonzaga analysis but Blessing requirements were
also met); Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2004); Long Term
Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2004); Bruggeman ex
rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 2003); Molina Healthcare
of Ind. v. Henderson, No. 1:06-cv-1483-JDT-WTL, 2006 WL 3518269, at *7-9 (S.D.
Ind. Dec. 4, 2006); Bertrand v. Maram, No. 05 C 0544, 2006 WL 2735494, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 25, 2006), aff’d, 495 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2007); M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F.
Supp. 2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Bio-Med. Applications of N.C., Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys.
Corp., 412 F. Supp. 2d 549, 553 (E.D.N.C. 2006); Clark v. Richman, 339 F. Supp. 2d
631, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2004); Watson v. Thorne, No. 03-227-JE, 2004 WL 1445113, at *2
(D. Or. Jun. 24, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d
1152 (9th Cir. 2006); Sanders ex rel. Rayl v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 317
F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1249-50 (D. Kan. 2004); Ass’n of Residential Res. in Minn. v. Minn.
Comm’r of Human Servs., No. Civ.03-2438(JRT/FLN), 2003 WL 22037719, at *5 (D.
Minn. Aug. 29, 2003); M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305-08 (D. Utah.
2003); Burlington United Methodist Family Servs., Inc. v. Atkins, 227 F. Supp. 2d
593, 596 n.3 (S.D. W. Va. 2002); Am. Soc’y of Consultant Pharmacists v. Concannon,
214 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D. Me. 2002).
154
See, e.g., Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 1483 (2008) (relying on Blessing); Spry v. Thompson, 487 F.3d 1272, 1275-76
(9th Cir. 2007) (relying on circuit precedent); Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
68 (2007) (relying on circuit precedent); Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 2006) (arguing that Gonzaga did not
alter precedent; even if it did, decisions in this litigation would have been correct);
Clayworth v. Bonta, 140 F. App’x 677, 678-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (relying on circuit
history); Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2003) (ignoring Gonzaga); Rolland
v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (appearing to ignore Gonzaga
modification of Blessing); Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2002)
(acknowledging Gonzaga but relying on Blessing test); Barton v. Summers, 293 F.3d
944, 953-54 (6th Cir. 2002) (ignoring Gonzaga); Queer v. Westmoreland County, No.
2:06-cv-325, 2007 WL 2407283, slip op. at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2007) (ignoring
Blessing and Gonzaga); Lewis v. Rendell, 501 F. Supp. 2d 671, 686-88 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(relying on circuit precedent pre- and post-Gonzaga and Blessing test); Clark K. v.
Guinn, No. 2:06-CV-1068-RCJ-RJJ, 2007 WL 1435428 (D. Nev. May 14, 2007)
(relying on circuit precedent); Katie A. v. Bonta, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070-71 (C.D.
Cal. 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Katie A. ex rel. Ludin v. L.A. County, 481
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007); Beeker v. Olszewski, 415 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (relying primarily on Wilder); A.G. ex rel. Giddens v. Arnold, No.
5:05CV2790C10GRJ, 2006 WL 334218, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2006) (ignoring
Gonzaga); Rosie D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2d 18, 52 (D. Mass. 2006) (relying on
circuit precedent); Protestant Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Maram, No. 5-CV-03-DRH,
2005 WL 2464460, at *4-5 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2005) (ignoring both Gonzaga and
Blessing but employing Wilder); Kapable Kids Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 420 F. Supp. 2d 956, 959-62 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (ignoring Gonzaga);
Mejia ex rel. Ramirez v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 3381(GBD), 2004 WL
2884407, at *9-11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2004) (ignoring Gonzaga); Ball v. Biedess, No.
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a line of federal court cases that created an additional circuit split
based upon a definition of “medical assistance” that asserts Medicaid is
only a source of money.155 At least two important possibilities arise
from this double circuit split: first, the Roberts Court may revisit
Gonzaga in the context of Medicaid entitlements; and second, the
Court can affect Medicaid deeply by denying petitions for certiorari in
cases that allow decisions to stand that limit private causes of action
and that limit the courts’ understanding of the Medicaid program.
1.

Patterns in the Uneven Application of Gonzaga

Though Gonzaga applies to all private attempts to redress violations
of federal law through § 1983 claims, this section will focus on
studying Medicaid-related claims. There are multiple Medicaid Act
provisions that enrollees seek to enforce, but three foundational
statutory sections account for many splits among federal circuit
courts. These statutory provisions mandate certain elements for state
Medicaid plans to qualify for federal funding under Medicaid; as states
must comply with these terms to receive federal funding, these are
classic conditions on Spending Clause legislation that create a
cooperative federalism program. The three provisions are 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(8), the “reasonable promptness” provision; 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10), the “minimum services” provision (which also
encompasses “comparability”); and 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), the
“equal access” provision, which is the current statutory adaptation of
the repealed Boren Amendment.156
CIV00-0067-TUC-EHC, 2004 WL 2566262, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2004), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ball, 492 F.3d 1094 (relying on circuit precedent); In re
NYAHSA Litig., 318 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d per curiam sub nom.
N.Y. Ass’n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging v. DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2006)
(relying on Blessing test, though mentioning Gonzaga for “creating rights” language);
Mendez v. Brown, 311 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137-40 (D. Mass. 2004) (relying primarily on
Blessing, but also analyzing Medicaid provisions in question under Gonzaga in
response to defendant’s arguments that Gonzaga is new standard); Kerr v. Holsinger,
No. Civ.A.03-68-H, 2004 WL 882203, at *3-4 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 25, 2004) (ignoring
Gonzaga); Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1333 (D.N.M. 2003)
(ignoring Gonzaga); Collins ex rel. Collins v. Hamilton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847
(S.D. Ind. 2002), aff’d, 349 F.3d 371 (7th Cir. 2003) (ignoring Gonzaga); WilsonCoker v. Thompson, 222 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196-97 (D. Conn. 2002) (relying primarily
on Blessing and circuit precedent pre-Gonzaga); Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940,
975-79 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (ignoring Gonzaga); Alexander A. ex rel. Barr v. Novello, 210
F.R.D. 27, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (ignoring Gonzaga).
155
See Bruggeman, 324 F.3d at 910.
156
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2006) (“A State plan for medical assistance
must . . . provide that all individuals wishing to make application for medical

2008]

Bizarre Love Triangle

445

Circuit courts that have addressed enrollee enforcement of the
reasonable promptness provision often also addressed the minimum
services provision and/or the equal access provision. Prior to
Gonzaga, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals provided the standard
for parsing the reasonable promptness provision in Doe v. Chiles,
which held that developmentally disabled individuals could seek
redress for failure to provide Medicaid-promised services under
§ 1983.157 After Gonzaga, most circuit courts have upheld the private
enforceability of the reasonable promptness provision,158 but some
district courts have taken reasonable promptness claims as
opportunities to declare that no private rights can be enforced under
the Medicaid Act pursuant to Gonzaga.159
Circuit courts that have addressed the minimum services provision
assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance
shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals . . . .”); 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (“A State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide — (A)
for making medical assistance available, including at least the care and services listed
in paragraphs (1) through (5), (17) and (21) of [§] 1905a(a), to — all individuals —
. . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (“A State plan for medical assistance must . . .
provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment
for, care and services available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard
against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments
are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the
extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area . . . .”).
157
See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714-19 (11th Cir. 1998). The decision also
addressed sovereign immunity, finding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted the
district court to award injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. See id. at 720-21.
158
See Kidd, 501 F.3d at 356, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1483 (Mar. 3, 2008) (No. 07913); Bertrand, 495 F.3d at 457-58; Fogarty, 472 F.3d at 1214; Mandy R. v. Owens, 464
F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006) (assuming that § 1983 allows private parties to
challenge reasonable promptness provision and minimum care and services provision),
cert. denied Mandy R. v. Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski,
454 F.3d 532, 540-42 (6th Cir. 2006); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180,
192 (3d Cir. 2004); Bryson, 308 F.3d at 88-89. The First Circuit decided a related case
in 2005 and upheld its opinion in Bryson v. Shumway. See Rullan, 397 F.3d at 73-75
(allowing § 1983 cause of action to require payment review for federally qualified health
centers in Puerto Rico, and relying on similar decision by Second Circuit in Community
Health Center v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002)).
159
See, e.g., M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307-08 (D. Utah 2003)
(rejecting analyses of circuit courts that found reasonable promptness provision to be
enforceable after Gonzaga, and holding provision unenforceable for lack of rightscreating language); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Houston, 245 F. Supp. 2d 653, 657, 660-61
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (explaining that Medicaid Act is never privately enforceable under
theory that no third-party beneficiary rights exist under Spending Clause legislation),
overturned by Sabree, 367 F.3d at 180.
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have allowed Medicaid enrollees to seek redress through § 1983. The
Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have permitted
Medicaid enrollees to enforce the Medicaid Act through § 1983, even
applying Gonzaga to the claims.160 The circuit courts have determined
that the minimum services provision creates an enforceable right
through § 1983 because the statutory language is framed in terms of
individual rights to medical assistance.161 In analyzing and adopting the
post-Gonzaga analysis of the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit
found the language of the minimum services provision (“A State
plan . . . must provide for making medical assistance available . . . to all
individuals”) indistinguishable from the language in Titles VI and IX
that the Gonzaga Court used as an example of clearly created individual
rights enforceable through § 1983.162 The trick to minimum services
claims, however, is that the plaintiffs must be within a category of
eligibility that entitles them to the claimed benefit; even if the plaintiffs
are within that category, if the benefit is optional rather than
mandatory, the state can apply for a waiver or amend its State plan to
avoid the plaintiffs’ § 1983 action. An example of this kind of
gamesmanship occurred in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
Lankford v. Sherman and prevented that court from determining
whether minimum services are still enforceable after Gonzaga.163
Federal appellate courts that have addressed the enforceability of the
equal access provision have determined that providers, and sometimes
enrollees, no longer have the ability to privately enforce the terms of
the Medicaid statute.164 A handful of cases highlight the trends
160
See Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159-62 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S.
Ct. 598 (2006); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that minimum services provision contains “precisely the sort of ‘rightscreating’ language identified in Gonzaga as critical to demonstrating a congressional
intent to establish a new right”); Sabree, 367 F.3d at 190 (“[I]t [is] difficult, if not
impossible, as a linguistic matter, to distinguish the import of the relevant [Medicaid
Act] language — ‘A State plan must provide’ — from the ‘No person shall’ language of
Titles VI and IX.”).
161
See, e.g., Watson, 436 F.3d at 1160-61. The court wrote, “This language is
unmistakably focused on the specific individuals . . . who meet eligibility
requirements.” Id. at 1160. A related provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), was not
enforceable through § 1983. See id. at 1162-63.
162
See id. at 1160-61.
163
See Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 506 (8th Cir. 2006).
164
Most recently the Fifth Circuit so held. See Equal Access for El Paso v.
Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 703-04 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that healthcare providers
and enrollees could not force Texas to increase payment rates to Medicaid providers in
effort to force state to comply with equal access provision, overruling pre-Gonzaga
decision in Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2000), to
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regarding denying private enforcement of the equal access provision
after Gonzaga. The Third Circuit augured the Gonzaga decision by
three months in holding that pharmacists could not enforce the
Medicaid equal access provision.165 Then-Judge Alito reasoned that
Congress did not intend to benefit Medicaid providers in enacting the
equal access provision, and thus, they had no federal right that could
be enforced under § 1983.166 The majority stated in dicta that
enrollees could enforce the equal access provision, or DHHS should
ensure that states are administering their Medicaid plans as
required.167 As a result of Gonzaga, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
also held that providers had no § 1983 cause of action to enforce the
equal access provision, which reversed that circuit’s position.168 Next,
the Ninth Circuit went a step further and decided that the equal access
provision does not provide individuals a right that is enforceable after
Gonzaga because the provision contains general language about
requirements for state participation in Medicaid rather than an
articulated individual right.169 Thus, after Gonzaga, no § 1983 action
by Medicaid providers or enrollees would be allowed in the Ninth
Circuit under the equal access provision, but the opinion
distinguished the reasonable promptness and minimum services
provisions as permissible.170 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also
held that the equal access provision could not be privately enforced by
providers or enrollees after Gonzaga, though pre-Gonzaga the court
extent it allowed enrollees to enforce statutory rights under equal access provision).
165
See Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 541-42 (3d Cir. 2002)
(enrollees were not party to action).
166
See id. at 536 (stating “it would be outlandish to argue that the Wilder/Blessing
intended-to-benefit requirement permits … 30(A) claims in federal court”); id. at 538
(reasoning that repeal of Boren Amendment and creation of equal access provision
prevented interpreting 30(A) as federal right for Medicaid healthcare providers). The
Third Circuit knowingly rejected the circuit decisions allowing Medicaid providers to
enforce the equal access provision. See id. at 542.
167
See id. at 543-44. Judge Becker’s dissent vehemently disagreed and decried the
belief that Medicaid enrollees could enforce the equal access provision without joining
forces with Medicaid providers given the “severe financial hardship” enrollees suffer.
Id. at 559 (Becker, J., dissenting).
168
See Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57-59 (1st
Cir. 2004) (enrollees were not party to action). The court in Long Term Care noted
the circuit divide that predated Gonzaga and questioned whether Gonzaga would
result in a “tidal shift or merely a shift in emphasis.” Id. at 58-59.
169
See Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005); see also
Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 34-35. In July 2007, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the
Sanchez holding but permitted enforcement of Medicaid’s “free choice” provisions.
See Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2007).
170
See Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1059.
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roundly rejected a notorious district court decision that would have
eliminated all private causes of action for Spending Clause
legislation.171
Finally, the Supreme Court was poised to decide a case on the
triangle of Spending Clause jurisprudence, § 1983, and Medicaid, but
the respondents settled the case and the Court issued a Disposal by
Summary Action in Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care.172 The Eighth
Circuit issued three decisions in this litigation, and despite the
intervening decision in Gonzaga, each of the decisions favored the
private parties seeking redress through § 1983, which included both
providers and enrollees in the Arkansas Medicaid program.173 A 2002
opinion held that both the Medicaid providers and parents of enrollees
could enforce Medicaid requirements via § 1983 against both the
Arkansas Department of Human Services (“ADHS”) and its officers.174
The circuit court remanded the case for further proceedings, but it
returned to the appellate level in 2004.175 The Eighth Circuit
primarily reviewed the district court’s holding that failure to conduct a
study to determine the implications of terminating services for special
needs children was a violation of the equal access provision and the
injunction prohibiting Arkansas from terminating services until an
impact study was conducted.176 The Eighth Circuit agreed that such a
study was a prerequisite to terminating Medicaid services due to the
171
See Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540-43 (6th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting private causes of action under § 1983 to enforce equal access provision and
adopting Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of “medical assistance”); Westside Mothers
v. Olszewski, 289 F.3d 852, 857-63 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting district court’s literal
contract analysis for Spending Clause legislation and permitting § 1983 cause of
action to enforce Medicaid programmatic requirements); Westside Mothers v.
Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 575-76, 584 & n.20, 585 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (calling
federal spending program contracts that did not create federal law unprotected by
Supremacy Clause, avoiding Ex parte Young by declaring Michigan’s officers immune
from suit, and rejecting use of § 1983 to enforce Medicaid provisions specifically and
Spending Clause legislation generally).
172
See 127 S. Ct. 3000, 3000 (2007).
173
Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. (Pediatric III), 443
F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2006); Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs. (Pediatric II), 364 F.3d 925, 927-28 (8th Cir. 2004); Pediatric Specialty
Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. (Pediatric I), 293 F.3d 472, 477-78 (8th Cir.
2002).
174
See Pediatric I, 293 F.3d at 477-80. This decision primarily hinged upon the
court’s interpretation of the minimum care and services provision, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10). Id. at 479 n.5. The equal access provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30),
was not mentioned in the 2002 decision.
175
See Pediatric II, 364 F.3d at 928-29.
176
See id.
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property interest Medicaid enrollees have in their benefits and the
procedural due process claims that arise when proper methods are not
used for withdrawing Medicaid benefits.177
The circuit court issued its third opinion in Pediatric Specialty Care
in 2006, and this go-round focused on the district court’s damages
award against past and present officers of ADHS and against ADHS as
an agency.178 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit considered Gonzaga’s
impact on its equal access provision analysis.179 The opinion rejected
the ADHS position that Gonzaga foreclosed all private causes of action
to enforce provisions of the Medicaid Act and held that the equal
access provision facilitates a cause of action for providers and
enrollees alike.180 Because the state officers appeared to be responsible
for violations of the equal access provision and other elements of the
Medicaid Act, the Eighth Circuit denied summary judgment based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity for the officers as to both monetary
damages and injunctive relief, but the court dismissed ADHS from the
case based on state sovereign immunity.181
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the state officers, whose
brief argued both immunity from damages and the plaintiffs’ inability
to enforce the Medicaid equal access provision under § 1983.182 This
177
See id. at 930-31. The Eighth Circuit did not agree, however, that the state’s
actions violated substantive due process. See id. at 931-32.
178
See Pediatric III, 443 F.3d at 1008-09, 1017. Experts testified that ADHS
restricted the care that could be approved for special needs children, contrary to the
actual medical needs of the children. See id. at 1010. A private contractor for ADHS
testified that it could approve only three and a half hours of care per day, even though
six is generally medically indicated, and that doctors produced boiler-plate denials of
care to facilitate the process of denying enrollees’ claims. See id. The plaintiffs alleged
that the state encouraged this conduct and that it supported deceptive behavior by the
private contractor so that appeals would never be fruitful for the enrollee. See id. at
1011. A registered nurse who had worked for the contractor was certain that it was
motivated to cut costs and services below the point intended by ADHS so that the
contract would continue to be renewed. See id. at 1011-12.
179
See id. at 1013-16. The court also reviewed Gonzaga’s impact on the first
Pediatric Specialty Services decision. See id. at 1013-14.
180
See id. at 1015.
181
See id. at 1017.
182
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit at 9-11, 20-21, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1356
(2006) (No. 06-415), 2006 WL 2726551. Arkansas wrote that the “more basic
question is whether there is a private statutory right entitling the plaintiffs to litigate
that issue under § 1983. The state’s position is that no federal statute creates any right
to receive Medicaid services that are not medically necessary as determined by [the
state].” Id. at 4-5. The physicians who made those determinations were accused of
denying care to keep their contract with the state, a decision that has no connection to
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would have presented an intriguing combination of issues for the
Roberts Court, as it would have facilitated discussion of both private
enforcement actions for Spending Clause legislation under § 1983 and
an exploration of sovereign immunity for state officers, perhaps even a
revisiting of the Ex parte Young doctrine.183 After meeting with the
Solicitor General’s office, however, the respondents withdrew the
damages claims against the ADHS officers and permitted the Court to
vacate and dismiss with prejudice the 2006 Eighth Circuit decision
with regard to the individual claims against the state officers.184
The variations in circuit courts’ determinations regarding
enforceability of these foundational Medicaid provisions have at least
three implications. First, the uncertainty regarding enforcement
among the circuits indicates the degree to which Gonzaga has failed to
“resolve any ambiguities.”185 Gonzaga resulted in an about-face on the
equal access provision, though circuit courts appear relatively
comfortable allowing private enforcement of the reasonable
promptness provision and the minimum services provision.186
Nevertheless, these decisions often split the proverbial baby, as
enrollees frequently raise all three provisions in litigation.187 Also,
they divide enrollees and providers, who were best able to work
together to defeat inadequate state actions under the equal access
provision.188 Medicaid enrollees are poor, medically fragile, often
medical necessity. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-10,
Selig, 127 S. Ct. 1356 (No. 06-415), 2006 WL 3419817.
183
See supra note 15.
184
See Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3000, 3000 (2007)
(granting certiorari and vacating judgment in Pediatric III); see also Petitioners’
Response to Respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness at 2-3, Selig, 127 S. Ct. 1356 (No.
06-415). The Tenth Circuit also held that the equal access provision was not
enforceable under § 1983 after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Pediatric
Specialty Care cases. See Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472
F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 68 (2007).
185
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002).
186
See supra notes 157-84 and accompanying text.
187
See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 539-44 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding that §§ 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10) are enforceable by § 1983 cause of action
after Gonzaga but that § 1396a(a)(30)(A) is no longer enforceable).
188
As Chief Judge Becker’s dissent in Houstoun noted, Medicaid beneficiaries are
not likely to be able to sue alone, as they are indigent by definition, and the opinion in
Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass’n does not square with Wilder. See Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n
v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 547-60 (3d Cir. 2002) (Becker, C.J., dissenting); see also
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 510 (1990). Chief Judge Becker accused the
Alito majority of deliberately narrowing the holding in Wilder, stating: “[I]t is not our
function to rewrite a Supreme Court opinion to narrow its holding . . . .” Houstoun,
283 F.3d at 554.
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either minors or elderly, and generally politically disenfranchised.
Joining forces with healthcare providers provides an advantage in
litigation, as enrollees have a hard time gaining access to courts
otherwise. The Medicaid Act’s purpose, to create the same basic rights
for all enrollees with flexibility for states to provide extra services for
their citizens,189 is defeated by differing and changing interpretations
in the federal circuits.190
Second, if the equal access provision is no longer enforceable, then
Wilder may no longer be supported by its statutory foundations and
the precedent risks being overturned by a Court that appears
interested in limiting § 1983 causes of action and in limiting the scope
of conditions on Spending Clause legislation.191 The Roberts Court
contains a majority that has demonstrated opposition to private
enforcement of conditions on federal spending in any context.192 A
number of federal appellate courts have determined that the equal
access provision is unenforceable after Gonzaga.193 The equal access
189
Though many aspects of state Medicaid coverage are optional, the federal
statutory scheme imposes an important floor regarding how little each state can
provide and still be entitled to the open-ended funding that Medicaid provides. See
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Healthcare System and How to Fix It: An Essay on
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 559-60 (2006) (noting that
despite federal requirements for state participation in Medicaid, states still have leeway
in providing benefits).
190
Congress envisioned Medicaid as an “egalitarian social contract for the poor”
that mandated basic elements of each state’s Medicaid plan and that permitted
optional elements of each State plan. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAW, & SARA
ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 416-17 (1997); see also
STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 57 (noting that newly enacted Medicaid program
contained “important provisions for minimal coverage of specified types of care,
which put Medicaid far beyond the Kerr-Mills program and were designed to lead to
comprehensive care”).
191
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Gonzaga noted that the new requirement for
unambiguous congressional intent “sub silentio overrules” Wilder and Wright because
those cases allowed causes of action when the underlying statutes did not necessarily
intend § 1983 to be a source of enforceable rights. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 300 n.8 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192
See infra Part III.A.1. Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent in Wilder, 496 U.S. at 524-29, and wrote a concurrence in Blessing,
520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997). Justice Thomas joined the majorities in Barnes v. Gorman,
536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002), and Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. Justice Alito addressed the
issue as a judge on the Third Circuit in Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d
180, 181 (3d Cir. 2004). Finally, Chief Justice Roberts wrote about the issue both as
Deputy Solicitor General and while in private practice. See Brief for Petitioners at 3943, Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273 (No. 01-679); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 11, Wilder, 496 U.S. 498 (No. 88-2043).
193
See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
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provision is the successor to the repealed Boren Amendment, which
was the basis for the all-important Wilder decision; thus, Wilder may
be in jeopardy.
Third, Medicaid is one statutory program by which Congress
intended to deliver a comprehensive set of benefits to fragile
populations. Federal courts, nonetheless, have read some provisions
to be enforceable by enrollees, some provisions to be enforceable by
providers, and some provisions to be enforceable by no one. Though
the statutory framework is long and complex, inconsistent and
variable enforcement possibilities can only confound the problem.
The statute is not necessarily clarified by Arlington, in which the Court
reformulated the standard for conditions on spending, demanding
clear notice to the states.194 The Arlington clear notice standard favors
the states, ignoring the idea of balance in a cooperative federalism
program, and strengthening the Gonzaga modification of the first
element of the Blessing test by narrowing the demand for an
“unambiguously conferred right” to a “clearly” conferred right for a
cause of action to exist under § 1983.195
2.

The Seventh Circuit Theory of Medical Assistance

An additional circuit split also affects the Medicaid Act; the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals formulated a novel definition of “medical
assistance” that a handful of additional circuits have adopted. In
Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit considered whether
Illinois violated the Medicaid Act by failing to provide intermediate
care facilities in the northern part of the state to developmentally
disabled adults.196 From the start, this decision was unconventional in
the realm of Medicaid Act jurisprudence. Rather than borrow the
Supreme Court’s Wilder description of Medicaid as a “cooperative
federal-state program through which the Federal Government
provides financial assistance to States so that they may furnish medical
care to needy individuals,” which many (if not all) other circuits had
done,197 Judge Posner called the program one that “defrays certain
medical expenses of individuals . . . who lack the wherewithal to pay

194

See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
Id. (analyzing conditions placed on spending from perspective of state agreeing
to federal funds).
196
See Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 908 (7th Cir. 2003).
197
See, e.g., Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Wilder, 496
U.S. at 502) (borrowing Court’s Wilder-based description of Medicaid program).
195

2008]

Bizarre Love Triangle

453

the expenses themselves.”198 The subsequent statutory analysis
determined that “medical assistance” indicates financial assistance, not
access to medical services, contrary to the interpretations of the First
and Eleventh Circuits, who were accused of missing the
“distinction.”199 The Seventh Circuit wrote that Medicaid is a
“payment scheme, not a scheme for state-provided medical assistance”
and held that the reasonable promptness provision was not violated by
the state’s failure to distribute intermediate care facilities to all
qualified citizens.200
Judge Posner distorted the fundamental nature of Medicaid with
that short description. His definition of Medicaid as merely money
rather than a program of medical care and access is a revisionist
reading that is contrary to conventional designs for and
understandings of Medicaid.201 Legislative history from the passage of
the Medicaid Act consistently uses the term “medical assistance” to
indicate something more than just money.202 Though the legislative
198

Bruggeman, 324 F.3d at 908.
See id. at 910 (citing Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 81, 88-89 (1st Cir.
2002); Chiles, 136 F.3d at 714, 717). The First and Eleventh Circuits were the only
two circuits to address private enforcement of the reasonable promptness provision at
the time Bruggeman was decided and thus the only decisions addressed by the Seventh
Circuit in this regard.
200
See id. The court held that all of the Medicaid Act claims failed and noted that
some were insufficient for private causes of action after Gonzaga and the “Supreme
Court’s hostility . . . implying such rights in spending statutes.” Id. at 911.
201
See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 52. Medicare and Medicaid had
dissimilar philosophical foundations; while Medicare was structured like Blue Cross
and Blue Shield insurance programs, Medicaid “was based not on the insurance
principles of specified benefits for specified contributions but on the time-worn
structure of federal grants-in-aid to states for medical assistance . . . . [P]rovision of
medical care to the poor appeared at last to be accepted as a national problem . . . .”
Id. The legislation that preceded Medicaid, called Kerr-Mills for the bill’s sponsors,
underlined the idea that Medicaid was intended to provide more than money;
Congress had passed Kerr-Mills with an “expectation that each state would indeed
provide adequate care so that a national problem would be avoided.” Id. at 29
(emphasis added). Stevens and Stevens further note:
199

Kerr-Mills was built on the dilemma that foreshadowed Medicaid. If benefits
for the medically indigent were to be viewed as a program of health services,
there was no actual virtue in attaching them administratively to a program of
public assistance cash benefits . . . . Kerr-Mills . . . was both a reflection of
inadequate medical services to those with low and middle incomes and an
extension of traditional notions of cash assistance under welfare programs.
Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
202
See S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 9 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1950.
The legislative history declared: “[T]o provide a more effective Kerr-Mills medical
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history does refer to assistance with medical costs, the goal in
improving the precursor Kerr-Mills medical assistance program and
creating Medicaid was something more. In creating Medicaid,
Congress strove not only to match money for the states but also to
ensure that “Medical assistance [is] made available to all individuals
receiving money payments under these programs and [that] the
medical care or services available to all such individuals [are] equal in
amount, duration, and scope.”203 The language used to describe
Medicaid also is different from that used for Medicare, passed in the
same amendment to the Social Security Act, which called its basic plan
“Hospital Insurance” and clearly was modeled on Blue Cross and Blue
Shield.204 The legislative history demonstrates that Congress modified
the medical assistance program to require states “to provide inpatient
hospital services, outpatient hospital services” and other enumerated
services; in other words, the states accepting Medicaid money must
provide services, not just money, to enrollees, which is something that
Kerr-Mills did not require.205
Despite historical and legislative evidence that Medicaid is more
than “financial assistance” and despite the Seventh Circuit’s limited
statutory reading,206 the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the
Bruggeman interpretation of medical assistance.207 The Sixth Circuit
assistance program for the aged and to extend its provisions to additional needy persons,
the bill would establish a single and separate medical care program to consolidate and
expand the differing provisions for the needy . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
203
Id.
204
See id. at 4; see also PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 374-75 (1982) (describing plan to make Medicare look like Blue Cross and
Blue Shield so that hospitals and physicians would participate in plan of which they
were wary).
205
See S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 73-74, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1951,
2014-15; see also MEDICAID COMM’N, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS vi (2006),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/medicaid/122906rpt.pdf (stating that Medicaid “can and must
continue to provide quality care to promote the best possible health for all beneficiaries”)
(emphasis added).
206
One circuit court highlights an additional problem with the Seventh Circuit’s
definition of “medical assistance” — it is read alone rather than in the context of the
statute. See Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that
any one of statutes that comprise Medicaid Act “is difficult to decipher if read either
independently of the history of the program or in isolation from other provisions of
the Medicaid Act”).
207
See Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208,
1214 (10th Cir. 2007); Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006);
Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2006). In 2007, the
Seventh Circuit allowed that a reasonable promptness claim could proceed in Illinois.
See Bertrand ex rel. Bertrand v. Maram, 495 F.3d 452, 456-58 (7th Cir. 2007).
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rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that medical assistance under
Medicaid requires the state to provide actual services. It also held,
however, that under the reasonable promptness provision all eligible
people could apply for Medicaid and receive prompt financial
assistance upon enrolling, and that the minimum services provision
required the state to pay for certain enumerated items of medical
care.208 The court did not preclude the plaintiffs from reframing their
argument that failure to pay enough frustrates the application of the
reasonable promptness and the minimum services provisions, but it
did reject the § 1983 claim for better payment under the equal access
provision.209 The Tenth Circuit twice has addressed the Posner
reading of medical assistance. In both instances it adopted the
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation while still allowing claims to proceed,
agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that the reasonable promptness and
minimum services provisions theoretically were enforceable under §
1983 and rejecting claims under the equal access provision.210 The
Third Circuit declined to consider the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation
of medical assistance, and the Fifth Circuit apparently ignored it.211
The Seventh Circuit’s version of medical assistance is problematic for
at least three reasons. First, it creates circuit court divisions where they
might not otherwise exist. Though circuits reviewing the reasonable
promptness and the minimum services provisions generally have upheld
§ 1983 enforceability, these same circuits do not agree on the meaning
of medical assistance. This adds to the confusion resulting from the
Gonzaga divide, but thus far the Court has denied petitions for certiorari
in these cases, thereby allowing this definition to persist.212
208

See Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 540.
See id. at 541-43.
210
See Mandy R., 464 F.3d at 1142-43, 1147-48 (adopting Posner interpretation
and agreeing with Sixth Circuit that reasonable promptness provision and minimum
services provision are still redressable under § 1983). The Tenth Circuit determined
that the plaintiffs’ claim of too few services was not sufficiently linked to the lack of
money, or underfunding, and thus the “State must pay for medical services, but it
need not provide them.” Id. at 1146. One year later, the Tenth Circuit reiterated its
Mandy R. analysis and rejected the district court’s holding that low rates of
reimbursement effectively deny care by virtue of reducing the number of healthcare
providers enrollees can see, thereby defeating the reasonable promptness and
minimum services provisions. See Fogarty, 472 F.3d at 1214-15 (applying medical
assistance as money theory and rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that rates were too low to
have appropriate numbers of providers participating in Medicaid program).
211
See S.D. ex rel. Dickinson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 605 n.31 (5th Cir. 2004);
Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 181 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004) (declaring
circuit split matter for district court).
212
See Fogarty, 472 F.3d at 1208, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 68 (2007); Mandy R., 464
209
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Second, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is inconsistent with the
statutory definition of medical assistance as the definition applies to the
total Medicaid Act.213 This leads to a disconnect where, for example,
courts permit states to reimburse so little that their Medicaid programs
are virtually ineffective, while admonishing them to pay promptly when
they do pay.214 Under this analysis, a state must agree to provide money
while not ensuring that the Medicaid program it has promised to its
citizens and to the Secretary of DHHS actually is effective. This is
contrary to the congressional intent in establishing Medicaid as a
program that provides “care and services” to the needy.215
F.3d at 1139, cert. denied sub nom. Mandy R. v. Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007).
213
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006) (providing that “‘medical assistance’ means
payment of part or all of the cost of the following care and services . . .” and
delineating 28 items that must be covered by state). Though standing alone this
provision refers only to payment, read within the context of the entire statutory
scheme (even setting aside legislative history), interpreting medical assistance as mere
payment is not consistent with its use throughout the Medicaid Act, wherein medical
assistance consistently indicates provision of care and services. For example, the
minimum services provision requires that a State plan “provide for making medical
assistance available, including at least the care and services listed . . . to all individuals
[who qualify].” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006); see also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 20-21, Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, No. 061482 (10th Cir. May 7, 2007). The brief also describes how interpreting the free
choice provision with the Posner definition of medical assistance is difficult, given
that the free choice provision requires the State plan to allow “any individual eligible
for medical assistance (including drugs)” to “obtain such assistance from any
institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service
or services required . . . .” See id. at 21 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)).
214
See Kenneth R. Wiggins, Medicaid and the Enforceable Right to Receive Medical
Assistance: The Need for a Definition of “Medical Assistance,” 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1487, 1509 (2006) (noting that Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of medical assistance
would render minimum services provision ineffective).
215
See, e.g., Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1215. The court wrote:
[T]he Medicaid Act requires participating states to provide beneficiaries
financial assistance rather than actual medical services. Thus, not only do
the statutes cited by plaintiffs not obligate defendants to ensure that EPSDT
services are “fully” delivered to the plaintiff class, those statutes impose no
obligation whatsoever on defendants to deliver any medical services. Rather
. . . defendants’ obligation under these statutes is to pay promptly for the
medical services outlined in the Medicaid Act, including EPSDT services.
Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 89-404, at 74, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1951, 2015
(adding provisions to Medicaid that require “a consistent statewide program at a
reasonable level of adequacy” and emphasizing that states must “utilize a sufficient
number of trained and qualified personnel in the administration of the program
including both medical and other professional staff”). The legislative history shows
that Congress expects the states to “bring about progressive improvement in the level
of institutional care and services provided to recipients of medical assistance . . . .
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Third, this interpretation of medical assistance, when read in
conjunction with the DRA, may prevent private enforcement of that
provision, which up to this point has been enforceable even after
Gonzaga. This is true even though this interpretation does not
currently prevent private enforcement of the minimum services
provision under traditional Medicaid. As described above, the DRA
Benchmark Provision permits states to alter State plans so that the
actuarial equivalent of Medicaid is provided to enrollees, which means
that states only have to provide premium support rather than
particular services as delineated in the minimum services provision.216
If medical assistance only means money, and the minimum services
provision can be eliminated from a state’s Medicaid plan by virtue of
the DRA, then enrollees have no benefit to enforce under § 1983. The
same problem exists with the reasonable promptness provision — it
becomes spectral given that money but no benefit is promised.
Medicaid enrollees could be effectively prevented from enforcing the
access to medical care that has been secured historically by § 1983
claims for specific benefits based on the Medicaid Act, because those
benefits are no longer promised.217
III. PROPOSED REMEDIES
Assuming Judge Alito’s prophetic concurrence in Sabree is correct,
Medicaid benefits are in danger of being limited to the agreement
[T]he State plan must . . . assure that . . . such care and services will be provided, in a
manner consistent with simplicity of administration and the best interests of the
recipient.” Id. at 76-77.
216
See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
217
Some think this would be a good thing. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, The Supreme
Court Term That Was and the One That Will Be, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FEDERALISM PROJECT, July 1, 2002, http://www.aei.org/
publications/pubID.15849/pub_detail.asp (analyzing Rehnquist Court’s antientitlement federalism). Mr. Greve wrote in analyzing the Gonzaga holding:
Not much further down the road, the Supreme Court’s federalism will hit
the mother of all entitlements, Medicaid. Stripped of legal details, the
central question in cases banging around in several federal circuits is
whether Medicaid benefits are an entitlement for individuals or for the states.
The former answer — Justice William Brennan’s answer, which is still
enshrined in law — means that Medicaid benefits will be defined and
enforced by Senator Hillary Clinton’s friends at the Children’s Defense Fund
in some federal court. The latter answer implies that Medicaid benefits are
shaped in a negotiating process between the states and the national
government, with some prospect of cost control and good sense.
Id.
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between the federal government and states with limited recourse for
enrollees who are not receiving the promised medical assistance.218
Courts have consistently deemed claims based on the equal access
provision unenforceable after Gonzaga, opening the door for Wilder to
be overturned overtly.219 Even though federal appellate courts have
upheld § 1983 private causes of action based on the reasonable
promptness provision and the minimum services provision, the
Seventh Circuit analysis of medical assistance, the Roberts Court’s
expected hostility to enforcement of Spending Clause conditions
through § 1983, and the Benchmark Provision leave little hope for
individual plaintiffs, whether they be providers or enrollees.
A. Why the Courts Are a Weakened Part of the Medicaid Safety Net
Congress appears to believe that § 1983 is sufficient for Medicaid
enforcement claims for both providers and enrollees. This is
evidenced by Congress’s actions after the Supreme Court decided in
Suter v. Artist M. that a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act was unenforceable through § 1983 because it imposed
only generalized duties on a state and not individual rights.220
Congress’s rejoinder was the “Suter fix,”221 federal legislation that
responded directly to the Court’s decision by stating that in any action
to enforce a provision of the Social Security Act (of which Medicaid is
a part), private enforcement would not be prevented by the existence
of a statutorily required state plan.222 In other words, Congress
218
See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 194 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito,
J., concurring).
219
See supra notes 164-84 and accompanying text.
220
See 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992). This decision also narrowed Thiboutot, discussed
above. See id. at 365-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 77-81.
221
See, e.g., Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (calling
Congress’s actions “Suter fix”).
222
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 reads in full:

In an action brought to enforce a provision of the Social Security Act, such
provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a
section of the Act requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents
of a State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds
for determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan
requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v.
Artist M., but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such
enforceability; provided, however, that this section is not intended to alter
the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that [§] 471(a)(15) of the Act is not
enforceable in a private right of action.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (2006) (citations omitted).
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expected Medicaid enrollees to be able to enforce their statutory rights
through § 1983, thereby tacitly acknowledging reliance on Thiboutot
and its progeny.223 As has been discussed herein, however, that line of
case law is jeopardized by changes in the Court’s composition and the
Court’s hostility to § 1983 claims to enforce conditions on spending.224
Congress cannot rely on the assumption that federal statutory rights
such as those found in the Medicaid Act will be enforceable through
§ 1983. Congress should take legislative action to provide the
enforcement mechanisms it has intended should exist for Medicaid
enrollees and providers.
Some would respond that the Court intended this; if Congress wants
a cause of action for Medicaid enrollees and providers, Congress
should clearly state that intent in the language of the Medicaid Act.225
After all, this is the objective of clear statement rules.226 Another issue
exists, though, that is not necessarily addressed by statutory insertions
into the Medicaid Act. Justices currently sitting on the Supreme Court
have suggested that conditions on spending can never be privately
enforced through § 1983 because beneficiaries of cooperative
federalism programs are the equivalent of third-party beneficiaries.227
Though the cases in which the third-party beneficiary contract theory
was advanced did not involve legislation that provided a private cause
of action, the juridical skepticism regarding the structure and purpose
of conditions on spending and the statutory entitlement that
conditions can create should not be overlooked. The contract analysis
in Barnes may not be the last of the discussions regarding the
Spending Clause power that suggest congressional exercises of this
223

See Chemerinsky, Ensuring, supra note 139, at 152-53 (noting that Congress has
had opportunities to change Court’s interpretation of § 1983 since Thiboutot, and yet
Congress has never acted to reverse that decision, and indeed reinforced it with “Suter
fix”). Professor Chemerinsky explains too that Congress rejected attempts to
eliminate § 1983 as a cause of action four times, and President Clinton vetoed
legislation that would have eliminated private causes of action. Id. at 152.
224
As Professor Rosenbaum has noted, individual actions to enforce statutory
obligations against states are “increasingly confined to selected program elements.”
See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 23-24.
225
See Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with
Clear Thinking about Conditional Grants of Power, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 162-66
(2004) (describing Rehnquist Court’s application of clear statement rules to variety of
laws, not limited to Spending Clause legislation).
226
See id. at 183 (calling clear statement rules proxy for ideological federalismoriented ends); see also Merrill, supra note 121, at 827-28 (describing and defining
clear statement rules during Rehnquist Court era).
227
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002); Barnes v. Gorman, 536
U.S. 181, 187 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 350 (1997).
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enumerated power are somehow less viable than other sources of
congressional authority.228
Notably, Justices’ examination of § 1983’s legislative purpose can
cut against the conclusion that § 1983 is unavailable for Medicaid
enrollees and providers. Section 1983 was created, as stated by the
majority in Thiboutot, as Reconstruction Era legislation with remedial
intent to prevent racial injustices.229 Allowing private enforcement of
Medicaid conditions on states helps to ensure that the states do not
treat disparately the populations that § 1983 originally protected.230
Thwarting § 1983 causes of action is particularly troubling given the
populations that receive the greatest benefit from Medicaid
coverage.231 Indeed, allowing § 1983 causes of action against state
officers arguably furthers the original intent of that statute’s creation
(inasmuch as legislation created ninety years later can do); in many
ways, the War on Poverty and Great Society programs, which helped
to create the Medicaid Act, were an extension of the stymied civil
rights movement following the Civil War.232
Nevertheless, the jurisprudence regarding the triangle of Medicaid,
the Spending Clause, and § 1983 has been steadily marching away
from access for private parties. Though the courts are not necessarily
228
See Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause
Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2008); Galle, supra note 225,
at 168 (rejecting contract analogy of spending legislation as inconsistent with textual
reading of power to spend for “general welfare”).
229
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1980).
230
One could argue that the parallels go even farther, as southern states
statistically spend less on each Medicaid enrollee. See Matthew, supra note 36, at 991
(charting disparities in state Medicaid enrollment and expenditures using public
information collected by DHHS). Of course, if there were racial discrimination in the
administration of programs such as Medicaid, a stand-alone cause of action would
exist under § 1983.
231
See Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 7, 28-29 (2001) (reporting that African Americans, women, and children are
populations primarily covered by Medicaid).
232
See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 42-48, 63-64 (describing how
Medicaid grew out of Great Society and War on Poverty programs); see also Vernellia
R. Randall, Racist Healthcare: Reforming an Unjust Health Care System to Meet the
Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127, 146-48 (1993) (explaining that
disparities based on race in healthcare system were not addressed effectively during
Reconstruction by Freedman Bureau and that during post-Reconstruction era African
Americans were excluded from medical system by virtue of segregation and outright
discrimination). The Warren Court’s criminal rights decisions and the public’s initial
embrace of those holdings as remedying racial inequities also demonstrate this kind of
connection. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 210-12 (2002).
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correct to so move, it is hard to predict if the judicial branch will
diverge from this course. This Article thus suggests a new set of
enforcement possibilities for this fragile set of statutory rights.
B. Seeking Safety Elsewhere
A question often arises: why must enrollees and providers have the
ability to privately enforce the Medicaid Act?233 States that participate
in Medicaid must agree to comply with the statutes and regulations
the federal government prescribes in creating State plans.234 If a state
does not perform as required by federal law and the state’s own plan, it
can be denied federal funds,235 as the Court has noted repeatedly and
pointedly.236 Yet, in forty years of Medicaid, CMS has shown that it is
not interested in the funding withdrawal remedy.237 CMS, which is
responsible for Medicaid, is notoriously uninterested in enforcing the
terms of State plans against the states; instead it seeks cooperation,
when it makes demands at all.238 Even if CMS were active in enforcing
233
Violations of statutory entitlements are not the same as the federal government
demanding “unconstitutional conditions” on the receipt of funds. See, e.g., Lynn A.
Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1193-94 (1990) (describing unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as one that “prohibits conditions on allocations in which the government
indirectly impinges on a protected activity or choice in a way that would be
unconstitutional if the same result had been achieved through a direct governmental
command”). Medicaid enrollees have no constitutionally protected right to healthcare
that is impinged, as no constitutional right to healthcare exists for any American.
234
See 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2006).
235
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006). The Secretary of DHHS has the power to
determine that a State plan “has been so changed that it no longer complies with the
provisions of [§] 1396a . . . ; or that in the administration of the plan there is a failure
to comply substantially with any such provision” after notice and an opportunity for a
hearing, and then the Secretary can withhold all Medicaid payments or certain
payments, continuing to pay for elements of the State plan that have not fallen out of
compliance with the Medicaid Act. Id. The Secretary can withhold funds until the
state complies. Id.
236
E.g., Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981) (noting
that for legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, typical remedy for
noncompliance is termination of federal funds).
237
See Key, supra note 65, at 292 (explaining that federal agencies seek state
compliance rather than cutting off federal funds when states fail to comply with
conditions on spending); see also Samberg-Champion, supra note 6, at 1839 (noting
that denial of federal funds is “blunt and seldom-used club” for all federal funding
programs in context of arguing that § 1983 claims are important enforcement tool,
even after Gonzaga).
238
See JOST, supra note 4, at 89 (noting that Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (precursor to DHHS) only performed 16 State plan conformity hearings in
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Medicaid withholding provisions, as Justice White noted in his
Pennhurst dissent,239 removing a state from the program is a draconian
measure that is not necessarily desirable or effective; this is especially
true for a long-standing federal spending program such as Medicaid
upon which many vulnerable citizens, and states, rely.240
Medicaid is an important safety net,241 especially in an age when
fewer and fewer Americans are able to access health insurance through
employers.242 Although Congress never intended to cover every
indigent person in need of medical assistance,243 the program still
covers important and needy populations.244 Medicaid providers and
enrollees cannot rely on states to provide Medicaid benefits as they are
statutorily required to do, otherwise governors would not constantly
seek flexibility, and the parade of litigation regarding Medicaid would
not exist.245 States often defy the requirements of the Medicaid Act,
and even when granted waivers, do not supply the benefits promised
to Medicaid enrollees. Also, under the DRA Benchmarking Provision,
the promised benefit only need be an actuarial equivalent, but history
indicates that states may try to circumvent even this loose

first three decades of Medicaid program’s existence).
239
See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 52-53 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White wrote
that “a funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to the supposed
beneficiaries of the Act” in the context of the Developmentally Disabled Act, and the
same is true for Medicaid beneficiaries. Id.
240
See JOST, supra note 4, at 45-46 (explaining that courts traditionally were
sympathetic to plight of Medicaid enrollees but that “today’s courts cannot always be
depended on to protect the poor”).
241
See generally CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA SMITH,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2006 (2007), http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf.
The percentage of people uninsured and the raw number of uninsured rose to 47
million people, or about 15.8% of the population, in 2006. See id. at 18. The number
and percentage of uninsured African Americans also rose, to 20.5% of that population
(roughly 7.6 million people). See id. at 19.
242
See id. at 18 (showing that 59.7% of people were covered by employer-based
health insurance in 2006, down from 60.2% in 2005).
243
See, e.g., STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 63-65 (describing categories of
eligibility under original Medicaid Act).
244
See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 231, at 25-38 (describing populations
served by Medicaid and ways in which program helps to battle disparities in care
related to race, poverty, and sex); see, e.g., Kevin Sack, Study Finds Cancer Diagnosis
Linked to Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, available at http://nytimes.com/2008/
02/18/health/18cancer.html (describing study that shows “uninsured and those
covered by Medicaid are more likely” to be diagnosed with cancer in later stages of
disease, which not only increases morbidity but also costs of treatment).
245
See supra Part III.
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requirement.246 Providing Medicaid enrollees and healthcare providers
with a cause of action has the added benefit of potentially aiding CMS
to prevent states from gaming the Medicaid system through methods
such as inter-governmental transfers (while not reducing funding, the
current CMS proposal), a problem CMS admits it has struggled to
prevent and that has interested Congress.247
At least three approaches would bypass Medicaid’s judicial jeopardy.
First, administrative remedies could be implemented to provide
procedures where none currently exist for Medicaid enrollees.248
Second, CMS could be tasked with greater responsibility for ensuring
that benefits are provided as promised.249 And third, Congress could
write the long-missing cause of action into the Medicaid Act.250 The
remedies suggested are not intended to be exclusive of one another,
nor exhaustive. These proposed remedies simply provide a starting
point for exploring appropriate protections. The National Governors’
Association recently asked Congress to end private causes of action in
providing suggestions for Medicaid reform; Congress did not choose
to incorporate this request into the DRA.251 One could infer that
246

See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 844-45
(6th ed. 2008).
247
See, e.g., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: OVERVIEW
AND IMPACT OF NEW REGULATIONS 4-5 (2008), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/7739.pdf; see also H.R. 5613, 110th Cong. § 5 (2008) (preventing CMS from
implementing rules to address problem of state overcharges by capping payments at cost
of covering Medicaid enrollees); Medicaid Financing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2008) (describing past
efforts by CMS to prevent states from overcharging Medicaid through intergovernmental transfers); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2007 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, MANAGEMENT ISSUE 4:
MEDICAID ADMINISTRATION 8-10 (2008), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/
challenges/files/TM_Challenges07.pdf. The Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”)
notes that once states receive federal funds for their Medicaid programs, those funds can
be reallocated easily to non-Medicaid purposes through inter-governmental transfers
that the OIG cannot trace. See id. at 7-8. Intra-governmental seems the correct
terminology given that the improper transfers occur within the state government, but
this is the term as defined by the OIG. See id. The OIG states that six states obtained
more than $3 billion in Medicaid funding by “requiring providers operated by units of
government, such as county-owned nursing homes, to return Medicaid payments to
State governments through [inter-governmental transfers].” Id. at 7.
248
See infra Part IV.B.1.
249
See infra Part IV.B.2.
250
See infra Part IV.B.3.
251
See NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 59, at § 16.2.5. The NGA made multiple
suggestions for reforming Medicaid, including some provisions that Congress adopted
as part of the DRA. See id. §§ 16.2.2, 16.2.3. The states suggested in section 16.2.5,
Judicial Reforms, that states have a “right” to “manage the optional Medicaid

464

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:413

Congress continues to find the private enforcement mechanism
appropriate and useful, and that the following suggestions could find
some political traction.252
1.

Individual Administrative Remedies

Limited administrative remedies exist within the Medicaid Act that
apply to narrow circumstances, such as denial of enrollment to
Medicaid applicants and mechanisms for Medicaid healthcare
providers to contest payment rates.253 Medicaid could be structured to
include administrative remedies that mirror those provided in the
Medicare statutory scheme.254 A model already exists for this type of
administrative process that would make its implementation reasonably
straightforward.255 And, administrative hearings (and resolutions) can
be faster and less expensive than judicial remedies, which is important
in the context of healthcare.
On the other hand, exhaustion of administrative remedies can be
burdensome, particularly in the medical context where every level of
administrative review before reaching a courthouse means more time
that access to healthcare services or payment for those services is
The model of Medicare beneficiaries’ detailed
denied.256
administrative process leads eventually to judicial intervention,
however, and thus other remedies must be considered for both
expediency and efficiency.257 Avoiding administrative exhaustion
requirements may become even more important in light of the
Benchmark Provision and looming limits on judicial remedies for all
beneficiaries of Spending Programs. Also, allowing enrollees and
categories . . . and the federal government should remove legal barriers that impede
this fundamental management tool.” Id. § 16.2.5. The preliminary report regarding
Medicaid reform stated more assertively: “Federal reforms are needed to constrain the
broad ability of judicial decrees in Medicaid cases that clearly impede state innovation
and reform.” NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, MEDICAID REFORM: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 8
(2005), http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0506medicaid.pdf.
252
Congress has rejected repeated attempts to limit the scope of § 1983 to permit
causes of action for civil rights laws, which supports this inference. See Key, supra
note 65, at 313 (noting that Senator Hatch introduced legislation three times to so
limit § 1983 and was rebuffed each time).
253
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2006) (providing hearing for those denied medical
assistance or for whom application is not acted upon with “reasonable promptness”);
42 C.F.R. § 447.253(e) (2008).
254
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2006).
255
See id.
256
See JOST, supra note 4, at 34-36.
257
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(A).
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providers to have causes of action, whether administrative or judicial
in nature, could help to prevent gaming of the federal match, which
federal agencies have a difficult time detecting.
2.

Agency Oversight

A related remedy could require CMS to police individual access and
provider rates in such a way that private causes of action are not
necessary.258 Though CMS exercises no such oversight currently,
DHHS engages in other forms of administrative supervision, including
administrative processes for disgruntled Medicare enrollees (described
above) and an extensive, and lucrative, fraud watch over federal
healthcare programs.259 The latter programs provide a framework for
creating greater CMS oversight of Medicaid, as the federal government
and the states, through Medicaid Fraud Control Units, work together
to catch fraud that funnels federal dollars away from their designated
programs.260 In this vein, the DRA strengthened Medicaid integrity
initiatives by creating a Comprehensive Medicaid Integrity Plan and
channeling additional money into CMS to help states “combat fraud,
waste and abuse in the Medicaid program.”261 Even though states
primarily are responsible for fraud prosecution through their Medicaid
Fraud Control Units, the DRA gives CMS the power and money to
provide “technical assistance, guidance and oversight” in states’ fraud
control efforts.262 This new fraud provision provides an example of
political will finding a way. Though Medicaid can be politically
fragile, its financial integrity is still a priority to Congress and CMS.
Perhaps protecting enrollees and participating providers should be
viewed as forms of program integrity too.

258
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America v. Walsh: The Supreme Court Allows the States to Proceed with Expanding
Access to Drugs, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 69, 79-82 (2004) (noting that
justices, in different pieces of decision, signaled interest in having DHHS resolve
Medicaid disputes).
259
This is a result of fraud-prosecution support provisions contained in the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. See Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§ 201-05, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
260
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID FRAUD & ABUSE —
GENERAL INFORMATION (2008), www.cms.hhs.gov/MDFraudAbuseGenInfo; OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, APR.-SEPT. 2007, at 27-33, http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/
semiannual/2007/SemiannualFinal2007.pdf.
261
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 260.
262
Id.
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Statutory “Clarity”

Congress could write a cause of action into the Medicaid Act, which
it assumes exists by virtue of § 1983.263 The § 1983 cause of action,
though, is not only fragile but also malleable and thus inherently not
as protective as an unambiguous, statutorily-provided private cause of
action would be.264 Also, writing a cause of action into Medicaid
would provide the “clear notice” to states that Arlington required (and
arguably Gonzaga) so that states can be held liable for failure to
provide promised benefits by not only the federal government but also
enrollees and healthcare providers.265 In addition, Congress must
either modify (or repeal) the Benchmark Provision, or it must ensure
that any statutory causes of action are explicitly recognized in states
with Benchmark plans.
States likely would protest the addition of a statutory cause of
action. One of the reasons that states have pushed for amendments to
Medicaid is that they have craved freedom from judicial review.266
But, states will ignore the demands of the Medicaid Act if possible, so
allowing them to be unaccountable except for agency oversight, as
suggested above, is not ideal. One benefit of § 1983 causes of action
for Medicaid enrollees has been the relative ease of access to federal
courthouses; compared to Medicare, which requires administrative
exhaustion in most instances, Medicaid enrollees have had fewer
procedural hurdles (though being impoverished and in poor health are
limiting factors, to be sure).267 Congress should recognize the Court’s
ongoing interest in clear statement rules when drafting a Medicaid
private enforcement action, especially given new precedents such as
Arlington.268 Arlington signals the Court’s interest in reining in federal
spending legislation while protecting states’ interests, which in the
263
See JOST, supra note 4, at 95 (describing history of “Suter fix” and how it
demonstrated Congress’s intent to incorporate decisions such as Thiboutot and Wilder
into federal statutory scheme).
264
Jost, supra note 14, at 152. Professor Jost recommends that Congress should at
least “explicitly recognize the federal right of action to enforce federal Medicaid
requirements that it has long assumed exists.” Id.
265
See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
(setting forth “clear notice” test for conditions on federal monies accepted by states in
cooperative federalism programs); see also Huberfeld, supra note 75, at 470.
266
See, e.g., NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, SHORT-RUN MEDICAID REFORM 9 (2005),
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0508medicaidreform.pdf (asking, among other things, for
option of benchmark coverage, for federal government to “remove legal barriers that
impede” states’ ability to manage Medicaid, and for DHHS to help states that are sued).
267
See JOST, supra note 4, at 36.
268
548 U.S. 291.
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Medicaid context includes limiting individuals’ ability to enforce
conditions on spending against the states through § 1983.
A more radical means to facilitate enrollee (and provider) safeguards
would be to create a qui tam relator cause of action and accompanying
protections within the Medicaid Act. The goal of facilitating qui tam
actions (which are sometimes referred to as whistleblower actions),
whether it be in Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse statutes,
environmental protection policy, antitrust litigation, or securities
regulations, generally is to protect the public by permitting
enforcement through private suits as well as public prosecutions.269
Though CMS has not made protecting Medicaid enrollees a high
priority, the dual-track method of protection that is facilitated by qui
tam actions could help CMS to institute stronger protections for
Medicaid beneficiaries.270 These actions would enhance scrutiny of
states as they implement conditions on federal spending and would
help Medicaid enrollees by facilitating their causes of action from both
a procedural and a monetary perspective.
Congress could limit qui tam actions by permitting standing only
for enrollees and providers who have suffered direct injury from the
state’s actions or omissions, rather than allowing any state citizen to
bring a cause of action regardless of harm (in contrast with the qui
tam relator provisions of the civil False Claims Act).271 For example,
antitrust litigation can only be initiated by a party that has been
harmed directly by the alleged wrongdoing.272 This limits the

269
See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling
Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995).
270
Arguably this could work to protect states, enrollees, and providers alike;
though sometimes the states align with the federal proposals, states can be harmed by
changes to the Medicaid program. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Governors of Both Parties
Oppose Medicaid Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at A18 (stating that governors
protested promulgation of new rules for state cost sharing when CMS decided it
would no longer match states for graduate medical education and other services).
271
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006). The qui tam provisions of the federal False
Claims Act allow anyone with direct and independent knowledge of violations of the
law to bring the information to the government’s attention and file an action on behalf
of the government. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730. No direct injury to the whistleblower is
necessary for the action to be brought or to be successful; the only requirement is that
the terms of the statute be violated. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773, 777-78 (2000) (holding that relator’s interest is tied to
government’s interest, conferring sufficient Article III standing).
272
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977)
(formulating rule for antitrust standing that requires plaintiff be injured in way that
was intended to be prevented by federal laws at issue); see also Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1994).
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misincentives that arise under statutes like the False Claims Act for
parties to bring actions because they can win the prosecution
lottery.273 Further, CMS could set up an internal review system to
ensure that the litigation is consistent with the goals of enabling qui
tam actions (i.e., protecting Medicaid enrollees and the Medicaid
program). An example of this structure exists in Section 7623 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which provides an award for whistleblowers
who are original sources for tips to the IRS that lead to recovering
underpayment of taxes.274 The IRS prosecutes cases after evaluation
by a newly formed Whistleblower Office, unlike the False Claims Act,
which allows the qui tam relator to proceed without government
intervention.275 Under the IRS regulatory scheme, the party providing
the information need not be harmed, so the example is most useful for
modeling governmental intervention and oversight.276
CONCLUSION
Though Medicaid was created to provide a statutory entitlement to
states, providers, and enrollees, it has failed to ensure that enrollees
receive promised benefits, both by lack of agency action and lack of
statutory enforcement provisions. DRA § 6044, combined with
personnel changes on the Supreme Court and the double circuit split,
likely will continue to narrow enforcement of Medicaid entitlements
through § 1983 claims if not eliminate them entirely. We have seen
already that the Roberts Court will not hesitate to revisit precedent,
and the Gonzaga decision certainly appears ripe for reconsideration
given the multiple interpretations that federal courts have issued.
Revisiting Gonzaga may result in a severe tightening, if not outright
elimination, of private causes of action to enforce conditions on
273
See generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with
Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 281 (2007) (describing empirically phenomenon of over-litigation that has
occurred under federal False Claims Act, particularly with regard to pharmaceutical
industry).
274
See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120
Stat. 2922, 2958-59 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2007)).
275
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730. The lack of requirement for suffering an injury has lead
to what Professor Matthew describes as a moral hazard problem, resulting in a glut of
qui tam relator cases. See Matthew, supra note 273, at 331-33. This Article does not
advocate for such a broad remedy, which Professor Matthew convincingly argues
opens the courthouse doors too widely. See id.
276
Also, recognizing the doctrine of Ex parte Young, Medicaid beneficiaries would not
be able to receive monetary damages against the state, but they should receive attorneys’
fees and expert witness costs. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148-50 (1908).
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federal spending provided to the states. A majority of the currently
sitting Justices have expressed skepticism that this avenue should be
open at all. Congress should act to protect Medicaid and its enrollees.
In a year of presidential primaries, debates, and soaring political
dialogue, the bizarre love triangle between Medicaid, Spending Clause
jurisprudence, and § 1983 also serves as a cautionary tale for federal
healthcare proposals. Major candidates described plans for universal
insurance coverage mandates; a strengthened Medicaid program is
consistent with this vision. Weakened Medicaid with greater state
flexibility has tended to lead to denials of benefits and denial of
enrollment; this is yet another reason that Congress should take a
harder look at modifications to the Medicaid Act such as the DRA’s
Benchmarking Provision, and perhaps even repeal the Benchmarking
Provision. Ironically, as soon as the states cried for flexibility in
Medicaid State plans, they asked for greater federal assistance in
covering the uninsured by increases in Medicaid matching funds, limits
on new rules promulgated by CMS that will cut Medicaid funding, and
increases in State Children’s Health Insurance Program funding.277
With the number of uninsured at forty-seven million and growing,
Congress cannot continue to assume that tinkering with Medicaid at the
expense of enrollees, while assuming that court enforcement will help
to smooth out any kinks, is a viable arrangement.278

277
See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATES PROMOTED BROADER COVERAGE FOR CHILDREN
IN 2007, BUT REPORT THAT A DECLINING ECONOMY COUPLED WITH LACK OF SCHIP
REAUTHORIZATION AND NEW FEDERAL RULES NOW COMPROMISE EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE
NUMBER OF UNINSURED (2008), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/kcmu012808nr.cfm.
278
At least one author is waiting with bated breath for the Court to discontinue
enforcement of Spending Clause legislation through § 1983. See William H. Pryor, Jr.,
The Demand for Clarity: Federalism, Statutory Construction, and the 2000 Term, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 361, 372-73 (2002) (writing that district court decision in Westside
Mothers v. Haveman was “sublime” and stating that spending clause jurisprudence,
“the area of federalism jurisprudence that has produced the fewest and most
deferential constitutional standards[,] may offer the best hope for the next landmark
decisions” and may soon move in Blessing concurrence direction).

